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Abstract

Digital forensics is the science concerned with discovering, preserving, and analyzing
evidence on digital devices. The intent is to be able to determine what events have taken place,
when they occurred, who performed them, and how they were performed. In order for an
investigation to be effective, it must exhibit several characteristics. The results produced must be
reliable, or else the theory of events based on the results will be flawed. The investigation must
be comprehensive, meaning that it must analyze all targets which may contain evidence of
forensic interest. Since any investigation must be performed within the constraints of available
time, storage, manpower, and computation, investigative techniques must be efficient. Finally, an
investigation must provide a coherent view of the events under question using the evidence
gathered. Unfortunately the set of currently available tools and techniques used in digital forensic
investigations does a poor job of supporting these characteristics. Many tools used contain bugs
which generate inaccurate results; there are many types of devices and data for which no analysis
techniques exist; most existing tools are woefully inefficient, failing to take advantage of modern
hardware; and the task of aggregating data into a coherent picture of events is largely left to the
investigator to perform manually. To remedy this situation, we developed a set of techniques to
facilitate more effective investigations. To improve reliability, we developed the Forensic
Discovery Auditing Module, a mechanism for auditing and enforcing controls on accesses to
evidence. To improve comprehensiveness, we developed ramparser, a tool for deep parsing of
Linux RAM images, which provides previously inaccessible data on the live state of a machine.
To improve efficiency, we developed a set of performance optimizations, and applied them to the
Scalpel file carver, creating order of magnitude improvements to processing speed and storage
requirements. Last, to facilitate more coherent investigations, we developed the Forensic
Automated Coherence Engine, which generates a high-level view of a system from the data
generated by low-level forensics tools. Together, these techniques significantly improve the
effectiveness of digital forensic investigations conducted using them.

Keywords: Computer Forensics, Digital Forensics, Digital Investigation, File Carving, Live
Forensics, RAM Forensics, Forensic Discovery, Forensic Discovery Auditing
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Chapter 1:
Introduction

1.1 Motivation
As the rate of technological advance continues to increase, science and society are forced to keep
up. This is especially true with respect to the effects of the rise of the use of computers in
society. Social networking software, like Facebook and Twitter continue to change the way
people communicate. The same can be said for voice over IP telephony, a la Skype, and peer-topeer file sharing networks. The pervasiveness of the Internet in general has made computers an
integral part of everyday life. Email has been the de facto standard for business communication
for some time, and digital phones are quickly rendering land line home phones obsolete. Debit
cards are well on their way to replacing cash as the de facto currency. The combination of RFID
and GPS technologies in widespread use allow real-time tracking of just about anything. But
with all of the benefits of this increased use of technology comes a corresponding increase in its
potential for abuse. The social networking phenomenon and RFID and GPS are rife with
possibilities for privacy invasion. IP telephony opens up the possibility for anyone with Internet
access to intercept anyone else’s phone calls. The rise of E-commerce and usage of electronic
payments has helped make identity theft and white collar financial crime a lucrative career for
the less-than-scrupulous. Nearly anonymous peer-to-peer file sharing also allows child
pornographers to share media with one another. Clearly, criminal activities have seen the
benefits of ubiquitous computing as surely as more benign activities have. It is this fact that
demands that there exist effective techniques for performing investigations of digital media.
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1.2 Characteristics of Effective Digital Forensic Investigation
The science of Digital Forensics, a relatively new discipline, deals with discovery of evidence on
digital devices in order to answer several questions including: what events have transpired?,
when did they transpire?, who was responsible?, and what was the mechanism by which the
events occurred? The set of devices to investigate encompasses a wide range, including
computers (from smartphones to data centers), PDAs, game consoles, RFID devices and other
types of digital equipment. Investigations proceed in four phases: digital media is collected, the
data is examined, analysis of the data attempts to answer the questions under investigation given
the evidence, and a report is generated. The ability to effectively conduct investigations is
imperative, because in many cases the stakes can be high (life, liberty). There are many
characteristics of effective digital forensic investigations; however this work focuses on a
specific core set of four: an effective digital forensic investigation must be reliable,
comprehensive, efficient, and coherent. In the following sections we discuss each of these, but
first we define an important concept: digital evidence. From Carrier [1], “digital evidence is data
that supports or refutes a hypothesis that was formulated during the investigation. This is a
general notion of evidence and may include data that may not be court admissible because it was
not properly or legally acquired.”
1.2.1 Reliable
We say an investigation is reliable if the evidence generated is accurate and free from tampering,
whether malicious or accidental. In the practical sense, in order for the results of an investigation
to be considered reliable, the investigator must be able to show that the evidence recovered was
handled properly - nothing has been added to, removed from, or changed on the original media.
This is achieved in part in standard investigations with the use of evidence bags. These sealed,
tamper-evident bags protect the evidence they contain, facilitate tracking the chain of custody of
the items, and hold information about the objects contained. These functions are important, as
evidence must pass admissibility tests, whether legal or just common sense, in order to be used.
Digital evidence must adhere to similar standards of admissibility, but instead of being contained
in physical bags, it is stored in files on disk.
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1.2.2 Comprehensive
We say that an investigation is comprehensive if its analysis includes all potential items of
interest. This may be impossible to achieve completely since resources dedicated to any
investigation are finite, but a comprehensive investigation should analyze as many of the
potentially interesting targets as possible. In a physical investigation this could mean searching
the entire scene of the crime, or interviewing witnesses and associates of the suspects and
victims. In the digital arena, where we cannot directly view the artifacts under investigation, this
means using established tools and techniques to analyze digital systems, and, for each system, its
many subsystems – file access and event timelines, physical media, system logs, installed
programs, running programs, open network connections and files, physical RAM, game console
devices, encrypted VOIP, registry settings, or search of audio, video files, large storage arrays,
just to name a few. Only a comprehensive investigation can hope to come to the most accurate
conclusions.
1.2.3 Efficient
We say an investigation is efficient if it maximizes the use of constrained resources, which can
include processing power, data storage, time, and manpower. Digital systems are extremely
complex creatures. Effective investigation requires analysis of digital artifacts at several layers
such that an investigator can make sense of the workings of the system as a whole. As many
types of data are not plainly displayed to an investigator (deleted files, file fragments, password
protected and encrypted files, proprietary file formats), accessing this data requires a large
number of tools and techniques, each of which require some use of resources. Of all of the
possibly relevant objects, the investigator must pick and choose which to focus his limited
resources on, whether these resources are computation, storage, or time. Efficient tools and
techniques can reduce turnaround time, allow more comprehensive investigation in the same
amount of time, or bring a target that was once too resource demanding to investigate at all into
the realm of the possible.
1.2.4 Coherent
We say that an investigation is coherent if the evidence resulting from the analysis can be used to
compile an integrated view of the events under question. After all of the above is said and done -
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reliable, comprehensive, efficient analysis has been performed - an investigation still must use all
of the evidence discovered and assemble an integrated picture of the events under question. This
involves taking evidence garnered from the multitude of different tools and techniques used and
forming a conclusion about answers to the questions in the investigation.

1.3 Current Practice
The current state of digital forensic investigation is plagued with problems when viewed in terms
of effectiveness. First, its reliability is suspect. Current standards of practice dictate that no
investigation take place using the original media (with the exception of live forensics techniques
discussed in Chapter 6). Instead, a bitwise copy of the original media is made and the
investigation is performed on the copy. To ensure that the copy is initially accurate, and is not
tampered with during the course of the investigation, a cryptographic hash is taken of the original
and the copy when it is created. Matching hashes imply that the copy is in fact accurate. At any
point during or after the investigation, another hash of the copy can be computed, and checked to
see that it still matches the hash of the original, and has therefore not been tampered with. This
system works well enough for tamper resistance, but there are other verification issues which are
not dealt with. First, there is no generally accepted method for tracking which operations were
performed on the media, by whom, and when. Some investigative tools produce logs of their
activity, but most do not. It is up to the investigator to track these activities manually, which is an
error prone process. Even more problematic, new digital forensic tools are created all the time to
address new types of targets in the field. These tools invariably have bugs, or logical errors
which have the potential to invisibly compromise the integrity of the generated evidence. There
is no systematic method in widespread use for determining if each of these tools in fact does
what it advertises, nor for a “chain of actions” recording which operations have been performed
on the media, by whom, and when.
Performing comprehensive investigations is problematic as well. There are myriad types of
equipment and data which might require analysis, and because digital artifacts are not plainly
visible, each requires analysis tools and techniques. While many of the tools and techniques
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required for these analyses are available to an investigator, many have simply not been created
yet. This situation, however, has not stopped new technologies from appearing at a rapid pace,
making the need for new tools even greater. Related to the challenges of performing analyses on
multiple types of targets is another issue of scope, that of target size. Most tools that are currently
available struggle to handle even moderately sized targets. Larger targets (on the order of
terabytes) are simply beyond their ability to process. While this is clearly a comprehensiveness
issue, it is also intimately related to the efficiency characteristic discussed in the next section.
Current digital forensic tools are painfully inefficient, most being single purpose tools hurriedly
created to address some small piece of the puzzle with no regard for efficiency. Almost none
takes advantage of multicore processors or high performance coprocessors, or makes efficient
use of available IO bandwidth or storage. Exacerbating this problem is the rapid increases in the
size of hard drives (and therefore the size of investigative targets) in production. This trend limits
the number of targets which can be analyzed, and also limits the individual targets that can be
analyzed, as some targets simply require too many resources for inefficient tools to manage. In
digital forensics investigations, where the analysis targets may possess huge amount of storage,
the need for IO efficiency is not to be understated. Efficiency is an important characteristic for
two interrelated reasons: if individual techniques require fewer resources to apply, then a larger
number of techniques can be brought to bear on the investigation in a fixed amount of time, and
targets which were too large to investigate otherwise can now be analyzed.
Creation of a coherent picture of the events in question in an investigation is also something for
which current techniques have difficulty. In the course of a comprehensive investigation, dozens
of digital forensic tools and techniques will have been brought to bear on the target. Each
provides information on some small facet of the system at different logical levels of the system
hierarchy, and all of which use different output formats for results and even use different
terminology for the same entities. For example, an investigation may turn up information on the
processes running on the system at some point in the past, a list of recently deleted files, and a
record of users’ logins. Are these events related to the question under investigation? Are they
related to one another? Certainly all of these describe entities on the systems which are
interrelated: users, files, processes, but the job of putting together a clear picture of the relations
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and how to answer the questions is, as of now, a manual operation. This uses resources just as
computation does, but the resources here are manpower and the cognitive powers of the
investigators.
Addressing these important issues is the focus of this research. Specifically, we present several
techniques for improving the efficacy of digital forensic investigations, in terms of improving
their reliability, comprehensiveness, efficiency and coherence.

1.4 Contributions
This dissertation research contributes the following to the field of digital forensic investigation:
•

Definition of the concept of an effective digital forensic investigation and discussion of
the four characteristics thereof.

•

A technique for enhancing the reliability characteristic of digital forensic investigations.
We present FDAM, a module for introducing auditing to digital forensic tools.

•

A technique for making digital forensic investigations (DFI) more comprehensive. We
present Ramparser, a tool for the deep analysis of images of physical RAM from Linux
machines.

•

A set of techniques for enhancing the efficiency of digital forensics tools. We apply this
set of techniques to the file carving tool Scalpel and show order-of-magnitude
improvements to its performance in terms of processing speed and disk usage.

•

A technique for aiding in the creation of a coherent picture of the state of a digital system.
We present FACE, a tool which automates the task of integrating the data produced by a
set of digital forensics tools.

•

Open source tools, which will be released to the community at large to aid further
research.

•

Several peer-reviewed research publications have resulted from this work (see Section
1.6).
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1.5 Organization
The organization of the rest of this work is as follows. Chapter 2 will give some background on
the digital forensic investigative process. Each of the successive 4 chapters discusses one of the
four characteristics of effective DFI, and each provides techniques for enhancing that
characteristic. Chapter 3 addresses reliability, Chapter 4 focuses on comprehensiveness,
efficiency is tackled in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 discusses coherence. Finally, Chapter 7 provides
conclusions and some directions for future work.

1.6 Bibliographic Attributions
Most of the material presented in this dissertation appears in previously published works.
•

The material in Chapter 3 appeared in the Journal of Digital Investigation [2] in 2007 as
joint work with V. Roussev and G. Richard III. The work introduced auditing techniques
in DFI, and FDAM, the forensics discovery auditing module.

•

The material in Chapters 4 and 6 appeared in the Proceedings of the 8th Annual Digital
Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) [3] in 2008 as joint work with A. Case, A.
Cristina, G. Richard III, and V. Roussev. This work introduced a live forensics technique
for analyzing the contents of physical RAM, as well as a technique for integrating the
data harvested in an investigation into a coherent whole.

•

The material in Chapter 5 appeared in:
o Proceedings of the Third Annual IFIP WG 11.9 International Conference on
Digital Forensics [4] in 2007 as joint work with G. Richard III and V. Roussev.
o Proceedings of the 7th Annual Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS)
[5] in 2007, as joint work with G. Richard III and V. Roussev.
o Handbook of Research on Computational Forensics, Digital Crime and
Investigation: Methods and Solutions [6] in 2009 as joint work with S. Movva, G.
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G. Richard III, V. Roussev, and L. Schwiebert. These works introduced a series
of performance enhancements for digital forensics tools.
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Chapter 2:
Digital Forensic Investigation Background

This section gives an overview of the digital forensics investigative process, which progresses
through a set of four phases: collection, examination, analysis, and reporting (see Figure 2.1
below). In the following sections we discuss each of these phases in turn.

DFI Process

Collection

Examination

Reporting

Analysis

Figure 2.1: The Digital Forensic Investigative Process.
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2.1 Collection
The initial phase, evidence collection, entails acquiring bitwise copies, termed images, of all
media which are suspected of containing evidence. The types of media include, but are not
limited to: hard drives, USB devices, physical RAM, CDs / DVDs and SD cards. Great care must
be taken to ensure that not only are the copies accurate, as they will be the basis of the
subsequent investigation, but also that the original media is not altered in the process. Any
alteration of either the copy or the original can render the entire investigation invalid. In order to
support the integrity of this process several tools have been created, some implemented in
hardware and others in software. On the hardware side, write blockers such as [7] [8] allow the
investigator to attach a drive to a special purpose controller which will disallow any write
operation from taking place on the connected drive. This allows for the ability to create an image
of a drive with no fear of altering the original. General purpose CD and DVD duplicators are
used to make copies of those specific types of media. PC expansion cards like Tribble [9] can
create images of volatile RAM and write the copy to external media. On the software side there
are write blockers which perform similarly to their hardware counterparts [10], as well as several
other tools for acquiring images, like FTK Imager [11] and dcfldd [12]. Tools such as mount [13]
on Linux systems have facilities for accessing a disk to make a copy while ensuring that the disk
is not written to. Once an image is acquired, its integrity is verified, generally by generating a
cryptographic hash like MD5 [14] or one of the SHA [15] family, of both the original and the
copy, and then comparing the two. The properties of the hashes used ensure that matching hash
values imply that the underlying data is in fact the same and the copy is accurate. Last, the
original media is securely stored away, and the remainder of the investigation utilizes the images.
Note that the storage requirements for this phase are on the order of the size of the original
media, which in some cases can be quite large (terabytes or greater).

2.2 Examination
The next phase, examination, entails enumerating the objects on the media. We use the term
objects here to mean any entity of forensic interest; as this changes for each investigation and for
10

investigations in general over time, we discuss only a small subset of the possibilities. This
enumeration occurs across multiple logical levels of a system, operating on multiple object types,
some examples of which are discussed here. For example with hard drives, generally during this
phase, partitions, operating systems, filesystems, and files themselves are catalogued using tools
like The Sleuthkit [16]. Files are categorized as one of numerous types, including documents,
images, logs, or configuration files. Deleted files are recovered (where possible) using file
carvers like Scalpel [17]. Several types of preprocessing can occur in this phase, including
thumbnail generation for digital photographic image files, hashing of individual files for filtering
and duplicate detection. The National Software Reference Library (NSRL) [18] contains a list of
hashes of known-benign files, such as standard operating system or application files. Using this
list, and the hashes of the files on the system under investigation, we can filter out of an
investigation those files which are of no forensic interest. Similarly, we can use file hashes to
quickly detect duplicate files on the system. A full text index can be generated, using DTSearch
[19], or using the Lucene [20] API over the raw drive, in order to facilitate later keyword
searches in the next phase. A timeline of filesystem activity can be generated using mactime
[21]. All files on the media can be scanned for evidence of malware using any number of
scanners, including Norton [22] and McAfee [23]. Items that may be of particular interest, like
deleted files, or files with incorrect extensions can be flagged as such. Encrypted and password
protected files can be singled out and password recovery tools such as Cain & Abel [24], or
Access Data’s Password Recovery Toolkit (PRTK) [25] can be brought to bear. Important to
note here is that this phase is tool-centric in that the tools do the majority of the work. This point
differentiates the current phase from the next, analysis, during which the burden is shifted to the
investigator. Many of the functions listed here are performed in the majority of investigations as
a sort of baseline, and several all-in-one suites, such as FTK [26], encase [27] and PyFlag [28]
exist to automate the process, and collect all of the results under one larger tool.

2.3 Analysis
During the analysis phase, the data generated in the previous phase is used to begin to answer the
questions under investigation. Where examination is mostly an enumeration of the objects in the
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system, analysis attempts to assign meaning to the objects in the context of the investigation.
Where we may have acquired and categorized files as email before, we now analyze (here, read)
them in order to determine if they are evidence which can be used to prove or disprove our
assertions. Much of the work here is cognitive on the part of the investigator, given minimal
support from tools which allow him to view the objects in the system. Evidence uncovered as
part of the analysis phase might require a jump back to the collection phase, in order to collect
other media, or to the examination phase, to enumerate types of objects on the forensic target
which were not previously examined.

2.4 Reporting
The final phase of the digital forensic investigative process is report generation. In this phase any
conclusions drawn from the analysis phase are compiled into a report. The report generally
contains conclusions, and the methodology used in the investigation which led to said
conclusions, and information required to verify the integrity of the investigation, such as a list of
the evidence media with their respective hash values, and forms verifying the chain of custody
for the evidence media. While some of the tool suites discussed above do have automatic report
generation features, most single purpose tools do not. It is left to the investigator to record his
methodology and manually construct a full report.
With this high-level understanding of the digital forensic investigative process, we now move on
to a more thorough discussion of each the characteristics of an effective digital forensic
investigation. In each of the following 4 chapters we address one of theses characteristics in
terms of the current state of practice, deficiencies therein, and techniques which foster more
effective investigations. We begin with reliability.
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Chapter 3:
Reliability

Given that digital forensic investigations (DFIs) have been the basis for sentencing people to
prison, as well as proving their innocence in the face of criminal charges, the need for reliability
is clearly important. For the purposes of this research, we use the term reliability not in the
statistical sense as a measure of the consistency of a repeated set of measurements, but as a
measure of the trustworthiness of the results of an investigation in the face of potential for errors
on the part of the investigator or the tools used. If the results of an investigation are not
trustworthy, then the entire investigative concept is undermined. In current practice, ensuring
that DFIs are reliable is mostly an ad-hoc process manually performed by the investigator. In this
chapter we detail how reliability issues are dealt with currently, point out failures in the system,
and provide a technique for improving reliability in DFI.

3.1 Current Practice
In a standard physical investigation, reliability begins with the collection of evidence at the crime
scene. The collected evidence is managed by storing it in physical evidence bags which aid in the
performance of several functions. They preserve the state of the stored object, and provide
evidence of tampering if it occurs. Chain of custody of the evidence is preserved by maintaining
a list of the persons who have accessed the evidence on the bag itself. Other metadata about the
case, such as case number, evidence item number, time and place of collection are recorded there
as well. Then the evidence is analyzed by the detectives with support from their forensics team
and in the end a report is generated detailing the findings of the investigation.
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3.1.1 Collection
DFIs deal with digital artifacts, so collection begins with acquiring an image of some digital
device. Of primary concern here is that the copy is accurate, and that the original media is not
altered. This process can be performed using hardware or software acquisition tools. In order to
ensure that the original media is not altered, acquisition tools use write-blocking techniques.
Hardware tools intercept accesses to the original media and do not allow write operation to
occur, while allowing read operations to pass unfettered. Software techniques work similarly
either by disallowing writes themselves, or by making sure to mount the original media as readonly at the block device or filesystem level. In order to guarantee that the copy is accurate,
cryptographic hash signatures like MD5, or those of the SHA family, are generated for the
original media and the copy. Matching hashes imply that the original and copy are in fact the
same.
3.1.2 Preservation
In DFI, where there is no physical container like the evidence bag in which to store objects,
digital evidence is stored in files on an investigation machine. This begs the question: how are
the functions performed by physical evidence bags duplicated in a DFI? In the simplest case,
these functions are performed in an ah-hoc manner by the investigator using a host of tools.
Tamper evidence is achieved by relying on the hash signatures generated on collection. At any
time the hash of the copy can be re-generated such that if any bits of the media have been
changed, the successive hashes generated will differ from the original hash. Chain of custody is
preserved by keeping records of accesses to the original media, as well as the copy. Other
metadata about the object is also recorded and stored by the investigator on some media, paper or
electronic. This process is ad-hoc, subject to omission and error prone at best. In order to address
this, the community is moving toward the use of digital evidence containers (DECs).
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Figure 3.1: Digital Evidence Bag [30].

DECs are containers constructed using normal operating system files, which, in an attempt to
more closely duplicate the functionality of physical evidence bags, bundle evidence objects with
some set of associated metadata. Below, we discuss some of the DECs currently in use.
Turner’s Digital Evidence Bags (DEBs) [29] [30] [31] (Figure 3.1) store evidence objects and
associated metadata in a file hierarchy. At the top is the tags file, which contains high-level
metadata such as a DEB identification number, the time and date the evidence was captured and
by whom, and a list of the Evidence Units (EUs) contained in the DEB. Also in the tags file are
Tag Continuity Blocks for tracking operations performed on the DEB, and a description of the
format of the index files. The index files contain listings of the contents of their associated bag
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files. Bag files contain actual evidence objects. Evidence objects can be binary blobs of data or
sets of files.
The Advanced Forensics Format (AFF) [32] [33] and its newer redesign, AFF4 [34], are
designed specifically to be open and extensible. They are free, open source, and free from overly
restrictive intellectual property constraints. AFF supports the definition of arbitrary metadata by
storing all data as name and value pairs, called segments. Some segments store the disk data and
others store metadata. Because of this general design, any metadata can be defined by simply
creating a new name and value pair. Each of the segments can be compressed to reduce the size
of drive images, and cryptographic hashes can be calculated for each segment to ensure data
integrity. AFF supports two compression algorithms: zlib, which is fast and reasonably efficient,
and LZMA, which is slower but dramatically more efficient. New versions of AFF also support
encryption of disk images. Also provided is the afflib [35] and a set of tools which allow for easy
creation and manipulation of AFF containers.
Generic Forensic Zip (Gfzip) [36] is similar to AFF, to the point of having a reasonable level of
interoperability. It provides facilities for compression, and uses strong x.509 certificates for
signing data and metadata.
Seekable Gzip (Sgzip) [37], used by PyFlag, is a version of gzip compression which allows fast
seeks through a file without having to uncompress it in its entirety. It achieves this by
compressing the given file in separate chunks (32k by default) such that only the needed data
chunk need be uncompressed. It does not, by itself, associate any metadata with image files
compressed with it.
The de facto standard for DECs is the proprietary Encase file format [38]. Based on the expert
witness compression format (EWF), it is the default container for the Encase and the FTK
forensics tool suites and the LinEn [39] Linux disk acquisition tool. Images can be stored
compressed or not, segmented or in a single chunk. Metadata is bundled in the container, the
header for which contains the date and time of acquisition, an examiner's name, notes on the
acquisition, and an optional password. CRCs are recorded throughout in order to detect damage
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to the data. Several other formats are in use (dcfldd, DIBS USA Rapid Action Imaging Device
(RAID) [40], and ProDiscover Image File Format [41] to name a few), but most have
functionality similar to those listed above.
Of note also is the fundamental “container” on which other are based, namely the dd raw format,
which is simply a byte for byte copy from the source disk to a standard operating system file,
with no associated metadata besides that recorded by the filesystem.
Using DECs to replicate some of the functionality of physical evidence bags resolves some of
the issues faced in performing reliable DFIs, but there are many other important issues which
they do not address.
3.1.3 Correctness
Because digital artifacts are not visible to the naked eye, investigation requires tools to make the
data visible. As technologies rapidly change, new tools must be developed for analysis of the
new data types produced by these new technologies. In the face of rapid development, we require
methods for guaranteeing that these tools perform as advertised. This is difficult for two reasons.
First there is simply a large number of tools, too many on which to perform exhaustive
correctness testing. Second, the datasets the tools operate on, and the resulting data they
generate, are also extremely large. This second point is due in part to one of the main differences
between physical and digital investigations – in the physical investigation of a crime scene,
investigators pick and choose items to collect as evidence for later analysis, whereas is an digital
investigation, the entire crime scene (digital device) can be collected or perfectly copied. This
leads to a glut of data which must be analyzed. Verifying nearly any level of correctness
manually is doomed to failure. There are two techniques in current use to mitigate these
problems.
The NIST [42] Computer Forensic Tool Testing Project (CFTT) [43] seeks to “establish a
methodology for testing computer forensic software tools by development of general tool
specifications, test procedures, test criteria, test sets, and test hardware.” The CFFT produces
unbiased reports on the correct performance of commonly used tools when faced with a standard
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set of test inputs. This can provide guidance to investigators as to which tools are most likely to
give accurate results, and make them aware of common errors made by the tools they use.
In a similar vein, in [44] Simpson et al introduce the Digital Corpora [45], a collection of data
sets to be used as standard forensic corpora for tool testing. These corpora will allow for
correctness testing of tools, for measuring relative performance, and other issues related to the
production and use of reliable DFI tools and techniques. Several other less formalized data sets
are available as well; see [46] for a listing.
3.1.4 Audit Trails
A normal DFI might involve the use of a large number of special purpose tools executed over the
course of the investigation with different tool used each time. In order for the results of the
investigation to be trustworthy, a detailed report must be generated, cataloguing the methodology
used to reach the investigation’s conclusions. We refer to the process of recording all operations
on the evidence as auditing. In order to support this, some tools produce audit logs of the
operations performed using them. Those that do support audit trails include mostly large tool
suites, such as FTK and Encase.

3.2 Issues
Write blockers, cryptographic hashes, DEBs, tool testing, and other techniques help in making
DFIs more reliable, but there are still several weaknesses that must be addressed in the tool
correctness and tool auditing areas to support reliable investigations.
On the correctness side, it is a simple fact that software and hardware forensics (and other) tools
have bugs. Some image acquisition tools mishandle errors on the original media, either skipping
bytes near the error, writing blocks with errors as zeros or just silently skipping blocks of input
when errors are encountered. Some tools fail to acquire the last sector of disks for disks having
an odd number of sectors [145]. Yet others fail to copy special disk areas, like the Host Protected
Area (HPA). See [47] [48] [49] for examples. That these types of errors exist for tools whose
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functionality is so easily described (“copy every byte accurately and report errors”) should be a
clear indicator of the need for some type of correctness verification for these and more complex
tools, such as those which parse complicated file formats, or create highly optimized full-text
indexes. The NIST CFTT provides a usable baseline, but it has at least one major drawback – the
testing done provides only a snapshot-in-time measure of correct performance. Newer versions
of the tested tools can introduce new bugs and therefore require re-testing. Additionally, the logic
of the underlying data beneath the tools can change, rendering their previously correct operation
incorrect. If, for example, the file format specification for some common document type is
changed, the tools which parse these documents must be updated to reflect the changes. In this
situation, continuing to use a known-good version of the parser document file parser can lead to
incorrect results. The NIST technique also requires substantial testing for each tool to verify its
correctness; this is a daunting challenge given the number of tool in use and the rate of
production of new tools.
Even if the correctness problem were solved, there are also reliability issues with regard to
auditing. The object of an investigation is to produce evidence supporting or refuting some
conjecture. If this evidence is to be relied on, the methodology used to generate that evidence
must be available for verification – without reproducibility the results of any investigation would
be suspect. The task of recording which operations were performed on the data collected during
an investigation is left largely to the investigator to perform manually. The sheer number of tools
and techniques which may have to be used makes this difficult. Some tools generate audit logs of
their activities, but most do not. Even those that do audit their activities produce different
amounts of logging information, and in formats generally incompatible with the outputs of other
tools. Moreover, are we to trust a tool to perform its own auditing in light of the correctness
issues discussed above? Even if we do, the investigator must still perform copious amounts of
manual bookkeeping, or be forced to use only one tool or tool suite which generates a usable,
correct audit log. Some DECs do provide hooks which allow generic tools to produce audit logs,
but these require voluntary participation on the part of the tools, and instrumentation of the tools
to use the presented APIs. In order to mitigate these problems of correctness and auditing, we
present the Forensic Discovery Auditing Module (FDAM).
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3.3 FDAM
FDAM provides two types of functionality: it enforces restrictions on attempts to access
evidence, and monitors the accesses it allows. Several design goals aid in these processes.
•

Audit Logging. The main purpose of the FDAM is to provide a complete and trustworthy
history of all data operations performed on the forensic image. Logging should be
performed both at the filesystem layer and at the block-device layer to fully document all
operations. Ideally, it should support various levels of detail (based on user needs) and
most common formats currently in use.

•

Flexible DEC Support. It should be able to import from and export to multiple digital
evidence container formats. This includes both specialized forensic containers, such as
DEB and AFF, and generic ones such as plain files and raw device images.

•

Tool Independence. The module should work for any application used in the forensic
process, including ‘non-forensic’ ones.

•

Tool/Agent Identification. The module should unambiguously identify the tool used to
perform each operation (along with its run-time parameters) and should be able to
attribute it to the user on whose behalf the operation is executed.

•

Policy Enforcement. Once it is possible to identify and attribute tool use, the next step is
to enable policy enforcement by blocking undesirable behavior. Policies can be based on
the type of tool used (either black-list, or white-list), user identity (access control), or tool
behavior (e.g. no write operations, no block-level operations). The last option allows for
the safe use of general-purpose tools that have not been tested (or certified) for forensic
use.
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Figure 3.2: FDAM Architecture.

3.3.1 Architecture
From a system design perspective, the logical place to install independent auditing is the
operating system, specifically, the filesystem interface. Since most tools rely on operating system
components to interpret the file system found on the forensic image (as opposed to interpreting
the raw image), installing an auditor here is a logical choice. We note that, for completeness, the
auditor should also be installed at the lower, block-level interface to document operations that
bypass the filesystem interface. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this work, however in
[4], we have demonstrated the use of a similar block-level device. The only addition it needs is
the secure logging, which would be substantially the same as with filesystem operations. The
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FDAM architecture is shown in Figure 3.2 and operates as follows. First, DEC containers (in
various supported formats) are imported by the kernel module, which results in the creation of a
block-level device (raw image) of the evidence data, and a mounted filesystem (if possible),
which are then presented to the applications for processing, as usual. We should point out that
the import does not necessarily mean that a new physical raw image is actually created. In fact,
we expect that the typical behavior would be to wrap the existing DEC with blockdevice/filesystem layer interfaces. Once the DEC is imported, all access is monitored and logged.
Finally, upon completion of the examination, the raw data and the logs are packed and sealed in
a DEC of choice. We expect that different types of DECs will be used, depending on the size and
complexity of the case. Under our scheme, it becomes possible to perform and document
conversions between different formats, as well as splitting and aggregation. Since all operations
are automatically recorded in a trusted log, it is straightforward to demonstrate chain of custody
and to verify integrity in an automated manner. The following sections survey implementation
choices for our design, discuss how native applications can transparently access DECs, and
describe some actual experience with our prototype implementation.
3.3.2

Implementation Choices

We evaluated the capabilities of several filesystems before choosing a candidate for native DEC
support, including ext2/3, ReiserFS, NTFS, and FUSE (File System in Userspace) [50]. NTFS
was eliminated from consideration because source code is not available, although NTFS alternate
data streams are an attractive mechanism for implementing DEC resource forks (e.g., blobs of
digital evidence, the audit log, and DEC metadata). Most of the other filesystems we considered
contain similar features that might be used to support efficient manipulation of DECs, such as
support for extended attributes (EAs). But the EA support in several of the candidate filesystems
is limited. FUSE offers reasonable performance, flexibility and verifiability. New ideas are
straightforward to implement and only a relatively small amount of additional code needs to be
verified for forensic soundness. Further, the user-level FUSE code is segregated from kernellevel filesystem code. We briefly discuss FUSE before providing some technical details about
our implementation.
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Figure 3.3 FUSE: Architecture.

3.3.3

FUSE Filesystem in Userspace

FUSE is a system for rapid development of filesystems. The architecture of FUSE is illustrated
in Figure 3.3. A FUSE kernel component, which implements a Virtual File System (VFS)
filesystem, traps system calls and redirects them to a userspace filesystem implementation, which
is compiled against the FUSE library. This allows new filesystems to be quickly designed and
built without the complexity of in-kernel hacking. The FUSE kernel module acts as a bridge to
the VFS kernel interfaces. To instrument system calls in FUSE, the new filesystem supplies a
structure fuse_operations that redirects system calls through functions defined by the filesystem.
This structure is depicted in Figure 3.4 below.
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static struct fuse_operations aud_oper = {
.getattr = aud_getattr,
.access = aud_access,
.readlink = aud_readlink,
.readdir = aud_readdir,
.mknod = aud_mknod,
.mkdir = aud_mkdir,
.symlink = aud_symlink,
.unlink = aud_unlink,
.rmdir = aud_rmdir,
.rename = aud_rename,
.link = aud_link,
.chmod = aud_chmod,
.chown = aud_chown,
.truncate = aud_truncate,
.utime = aud_utime,
.open = aud_open,
.read = aud_read,
.write = aud_write,
.statfs = aud_statfs,
.release = aud_release,
.fsync = aud_fsync,
#ifdef HAVE_SETXATTR
.setxattr = aud_setxattr,
.getxattr = aud_getxattr,
.listxattr = aud_listxattr,
.removexattr= aud_removexattr,
#endif
}

Figure 3.4: struct fuse_operations.

Each of these functions can completely redefine a filesystem operation, augment its
functionality, or provide auditing. For example, to audit write operations, a filesystem can define
the function aud_write() to record information about the calling process and then call the
standard FUSE function to carry out the write operation. The function fuse_get_context() allows
the UID, GID, and process ID of the calling process to be obtained within each file operation.
This information can then be supplemented with any of the plethora of information in the /proc
pseudo filesystem (under Linux) to build the context for the write, such as the name of the
application, or the exact command line invocation.
FUSE currently has ports for Linux and FreeBSD and a number of language bindings, including
C, C++, Python, and Perl. FUSE is being actively developed and is in widespread use; one of the
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most important uses of FUSE is for NTFS support in Linux, via ntfs-3g [134]. As of kernel
version 2.6.14, FUSE is integrated into the Linux kernel.
3.3.4 Prototype
We have developed a prototype system for native filesystem support for both DEC-enabled and
legacy applications, based on FUSE. Our system is developed in C and Python, under Linux. In
our prototype, user-level applications are currently used to import and export DECs into and out
of a special DEC-aware FUSE filesystem. An import operation essentially splits the DEC into
component files and places these files into the filesystem, along with the DEC audit log and
other metadata. Exporting a DEC from the DEC-enabled filesystem simply recreates the DEC
structure from the data stored in the corresponding directories in the filesystem. The use of these
import and export applications enables our system to be neutral with regard to developing
standards for DEC structure. Our prototype provides automatic auditing of access to DECs by
applications. Many applications, including those specifically designed for digital forensics
investigation (e.g., file carvers) and those which are not (e.g., dd and other common Unix
command line programs) may never be modified for DEC compliance. So our implementation
instruments filesystem-level system calls (through FUSE), such as file open, read, and write
operations, and captures information about both the calling application and the operations
themselves. Applications may simply use the standard C library open(), close(), read(), and
write() operations (and their buffered counterparts) on digital evidence blobs contained within a
DEC. Access to the blobs of digital evidence in a DEC automatically results in updates of the
audit log. For example, an open operation records information including the user ID, process ID,
MD5 hash of the accessing application's executable, the date and time, and the command line of
the accessing application. Auditing of read/write operations ties these operations to the
associated open operation and writes entries in the log detailing the offsets and lengths of the
data accessed. To illustrate, fragments of an audit log for a DEC containing a single disk image
are illustrated in Figure 3.5. The contents of the DEC were accessed by a number of applications,
including tools from the Sleuthkit and a file carver. The actual log is much larger; these
fragments are provided to illustrate the information gathered on each operation.
Thu Aug 31 18:07:43 2006 uid: 0, gid: 0, pid: 22071
eid: 1 open: /root/work/audit_fs/evidence/ext2_image/ext2_image
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executable: /usr/bin/fsstat
hash: 7b16b5e9abf862528f54d2405686aa27
execution: fsstat ext2_image
Thu Aug 31 18:07:43 2006 eid: 1 read length: 32768, starting at: 0
Thu Aug 31 18:07:43 2006 eid: 1 read length: 4096, starting at: 65536
Thu Aug 31 18:07:43 2006 eid: 1 read length: 4096, starting at: 262144
Thu Aug 31 18:07:43 2006 release:
/root/work/audit_fs/evidence/ext2_image/ext2_image
...
...
Thu Aug 31 18:07:51 2006 uid: 0, gid: 0, pid: 22083
eid: 2 open: /root/work/audit_fs/evidence/ext2_image/ext2_image
executable: /usr/bin/sleuthkit/ils
hash: 5b6e1d30a8b02d5d01adc24c4bc7b57b
execution: ils ext2_image
Thu Aug 31 18:07:51 2006 eid: 2 read length: 32768, starting at: 0
Thu Aug 31 18:07:51 2006 eid: 2 read length: 4096, starting at: 65536
Thu Aug 31 18:07:51 2006 eid: 2 read length: 4096, starting at: 262144
Thu Aug 31 18:07:51 2006 eid: 2 read length: 16384, starting at: 32768
Thu Aug 31 18:07:51 2006 eid: 2 read length: 16384, starting at: 49152
...
...
Thu Aug 31 18:07:52 2006 eid: 2 read length: 131072, starting at: 940949504
Thu Aug 31 18:07:52 2006 eid: 2 read length: 131072, starting at: 941080576
Thu Aug 31 18:07:52 2006 eid: 2 read length: 131072, starting at: 941211648
Thu Aug 31 18:07:52 2006 eid: 2 read length: 131072, starting at: 941342720
Thu Aug 31 18:07:52 2006 eid: 2 read length: 131072, starting at: 941473792
Thu Aug 31 18:07:52 2006 eid: 2 read length: 131072, starting at: 941604864
Thu Aug 31 18:07:52 2006 release:
/root/work/audit_fs/evidence/ext2_image/ext2_image
...
...
Thu Aug 31 18:08:04 2006 uid: 0, gid: 0, pid: 22097
eid: 5 open: /root/work/audit_fs/evidence/ext2_image/ext2_image
executable: /usr/local/bin/scalpel
hash: 8ab31b90d800ed36da88cdaa5176aaaa
execution: scalpel ext2_image
Thu Aug 31 18:08:04 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 0
Thu Aug 31 18:08:04 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 131072
Thu Aug 31 18:08:04 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 262144
Thu Aug 31 18:08:04 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 393216
Thu Aug 31 18:08:04 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 524288
Thu Aug 31 18:08:04 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 655360
Thu Aug 31 18:08:04 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 786432
...
...
Thu Aug 31 18:09:32 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 744095744
Thu Aug 31 18:09:32 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 744226816
Thu Aug 31 18:09:32 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 744357888
Thu Aug 31 18:09:32 2006 eid: 5 read length: 131072, starting at: 744488960
Thu Aug 31 18:09:32 2006 release:
/root/work/audit_fs/evidence/ext2_image/ext2_image

Figure 3.5: Sample FDAM Output.
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To provide an acceptable balance between performance and thorough auditing, our prototype
allows many options to be configured on installation. One option is automatic hashing of the
executables of applications accessing a DEC (e.g., when an open operation is performed).
Another is automatic hashing of components of the DEC, as well as the entire DEC, after certain
operations such a write() or a close(). To conclude this discussion, we note that the amount of
information that can be gathered by our prototype about the calling application and the state of
the DEC is enormous—for example, in some circumstances it might be useful to track which
other files a application has open, which network connections are open, the BIOS version of the
machine performing the investigation, etc. Configurability allows an appropriate balance
between performance and adequate oversight of an investigation.

Table 3.1: FDAM Performance Overhead.

3.3.5 Performance Study
We ran a number of experiments to determine the overhead of auditing access to DECs. These
experiments target unmodified legacy applications accessing blobs of digital evidence stored in a
DEC inside of our prototype DEC-enabled filesystem. For these experiments the Python
implementation of the filesystem was used. The C version generally exhibits slightly better
performance. Table 3.1 presents representative performance results. We ran cat, md5sum, and
Scalpel on a 960MB ext2 disk image, stored in an ext3 partition and in our DEC-enabled
filesystem. For each application, three executions were timed, with reboots of the test machine
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between each run to minimize caching effects. The average of the three runs is reported. The
overhead for access to digital evidence by legacy applications in the DEC-enabled filesystem
varies from 5-13%. Scalpel, a file carver, incurs more overhead because it makes two passes over
the entire disk image. In a number of additional experiments, we've observed an average
overhead of approximately 9%. Additionally, we note that accesses over network file sharing
applications such as Samba obfuscate the name of the application touching a blob of digital
evidence. For example, if a Windows application accesses DEB data through a Samba share, the
audit log shows only smbd as the accessing application (i.e., the Samba daemon under Linux).
Such limitations illustrate the need for additional work on support for networked access to DECs.

3.4 Discussion
In this chapter we have discussed the issue of reliability in DFI, including current practice and
some of its weaknesses. Current tools and techniques do not provide a mechanism for tracking
which operations have been performed on the evidence data and by whom and when. This forces
the investigator to manage tracking the steps of the investigation manually, an error-prone
process. To provide for more reliability in DFI we presented FDAM, a module for auditing and
controlling access to digital evidence by forensics tools. FDAM provides a virtual filesystem
which monitors all accesses made to files kept within it, and logs access to protected files. The
level of logging is configurable, and so can record the time and date of accesses, which user ran
the accessing process, and even which parts of the evidence data the tool read or wrote. Records
of exactly which pieces of the evidence files were touched can be used to audit the correct
operation of the tools used. In addition to monitoring, FDAM can control access, e.g. blocking
all write operations to evidence files. These functions together can protect evidence, and keep
records of the context of accesses, increasing the reliability of the investigation itself. In the next
chapter, we change focus to another feature of effective DFI, comprehensiveness.
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Chapter 4:
Comprehensiveness

When we attempt to enumerate all of the interesting types of data that could be part of an
investigation, we quickly see that the list is nearly endless, and yet it continues to grow. As each
of these types is a digital artifact and cannot be plainly seen, each requires a tool implementation
in order to facilitate effective analysis. While these tools exist for basic investigation of many of
the more commonly seen data types, for many others they do not. In this chapter we discuss the
need for new tools to keep up with advances in technology in order to support comprehensive
investigations.

4.1 Current Practice
Digital forensic investigation (DFI) has at its disposal reasonable tool coverage for many types of
data. Here we detail the coverage provided by existing tools and techniques. Note that new tool
appear daily, and there is no central point of advertising or distribution, so an exhaustive study is
impossible; we will however attempt to provide a reasonably accurate picture as of this writing.
We proceed by organizing tools by their functionality based on the types of targets they apply to.
4.1.1 Disk Forensics
By far the most common type of device on which to perform DFI is the hard drive. It also has by
far the most tools devoted to its examination. For coverage of image acquisition, integrity
verification, and containers, refer to Chapter 3. Disks can be analyzed on several logical levels
such as the raw bytes, or in terms of partitions, filesystems, or files. At the raw disk level, the
most obvious type of analysis is to look at the bytes. Several viewers are available which present
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the investigator with a hexadecimal encoded view of the raw disk: WinHex [51], Ghex [52], xxd
[53], and hexedit [54] are just a few. This type of analysis is helpful when a more powerful tool
is not available, but is of limited overall help simply because viewing terabytes of hex-encoded
data one page at a time sheds little light on the state of the machine or the events which have
occurred on it. Hex viewers do however form a baseline in that they exist for all common
platforms, and can be used to view any type of file. Since we are often interested in finding
references to people, places, or key words, tools exist which will parse strings resembling words
from raw disks. Some simply output the strings found (Binutils strings [55]) while others such as
dtSearch,[19] which are more full-featured produce highly optimized full-text indexes of strings
from multiple encodings (ACSII, Unicode), which facilitate fast searches. As some disks have no
filesystems on them, either due to malicious intent, or accidental corruption, investigators have a
their disposal file carvers (e.g. ,Scalpel [17], Foremost [56], or Rapier [57]). These tools use
several techniques in an attempt to recover files from a disk where no filesystem metadata exists,
by searching a disk for known binary signatures of specific file types and then copying out
sequences of bytes as potential recovered files. Where partitions do exist, tools like fdisk [58] can
list the partitions on a disk. If filesystems exist within the partitions, tools from the Sleuthkit
suite allows an investigator to fully parse files and filesystem metadata, attempt recovery of
deleted files, create timelines of filesystem activity, and many other useful operations. At the file
level, the file tool can determine the type of a file by looking at its structure, and grep [59] can
search for strings within files. Myriad application-specific tools exist, and are discussed below.
4.1.2 Network Forensics
As more data moves across the network and over the Internet, the need for tools to investigate
these data flows increases in importance. tcpdump [60], windump [61], snort [62] and similar
can capture into an easily parseable format (such as PCAP [63]) all live traffic that crosses the
network interface of a machine. Wireshark [64], a much more powerful tool, can similarly
capture network traffic, but can also decode hundreds of common protocols into easily viewable
formats, and can reconstruct independent data streams into sessions. Additionally, Wireshark can
decrypt SSL /TLS sessions under some circumstances when the needed keys are known. ngrep
[65] facilitates string search on network captures, similarly to grep above, but is also networkpacket-aware. Tcpextract [66] can extract complete files from network flows in which files were
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transferred. The dsniff [67] suite of network capture and protocol parsing tools performs a whole
host of functions, including ARP cache poisoning, password sniffing for many plaintext
protocols, and URL mirroring. Tools like Nmap [68] can scan networks for hosts, and determine
the operating system and server applications in use. Netcat [69] is a simple network client and
server which allows an investigator to easily move data around a network. Resolving hostnames
to IP addresses and the reverse can be done with dig [70], whois [71], and nslookup [72]. While
the above tools work on many types of networks, several tools exist specifically for analyzing
wireless networks. Kismet [73] and Netstumbler [74] can scan for wireless networks, including
those which are hidden, and Kismet can log wireless network traffic.
4.1.3 RAM Forensics
There is increasing interest in performing deep memory analysis as a standard part of digital
forensics investigation, because a substantial amount of potential evidence is lost if this source is
ignored. Recently, a number of utilities for parsing Windows memory dumps have been
developed, with a primary catalyst being the 2005 DFRWS memory analysis challenge [75]. The
Volatility framework [76] extracts information from Windows XP SP2 and SP3 memory dumps,
including a list of running processes, open network connections, loaded DLLs, and Virtual
Address Descriptor (VAD) information. The knttools [77] dump information about processes,
threads, access tokens, the handle table, and other OS structures from a Windows memory dump.
Memparser [78] is capable of outputting similar information with cross-referencing used to
detect hidden objects. Schuster’s ptfinder tools [79] take a different approach and instead of
walking OS structures, attempt to carve objects that represent threads and processes directly from
the memory dump. This allows hidden processes to be more easily discovered and can also
reveal information about recently terminated processes. [80] provides an overview of several
memory acquisition tools for Microsoft Windows. PyFlag, in addition parsing disks, log files,
network traces, parses Windows memory dumps (by incorporating Volatility), and Linux
memory dumps for some specific kernels by wrapping the crash [81] kernel debugger.
Memoryze [82] can be used to enumerate running processes, loaded drivers and search for hooks
on live Windows systems as well as on memory dumps.

31

4.1.4 Application-Specific Tools
Hundreds of other small single-purpose tools exist, each of which facilitates examination of data
specific to some application. Any attempt at an exhaustive discussion is futile, but here we give a
sampling of what exists. An investigator can construct timelines of file accesses with mactime,
using file MAC times. CacheView [83], Pasco [84], and Web Historian [85] parse browser
caches and history for common web browsers. Skype-Parser [86] gives information on when
calls and chat sessions occurred, and who the participating parties were. P2P Marshall [87]
discovers information on p2p software installed, removed, and used on a system. Paraben’s Chat
Examiner [88] parses log files from many common chat programs. Process Monitor [89], Access
Data Registry Viewer [90], RegViewer [91] and others provide various methods for Windows
registry analysis, on both Windows and Linux platforms. NTFS alternate data streams can be
viewed with Stream Viewer [92]. Recycle Bin metadata files (index2.dat) can be parsed by rifiuti
[93] to show evidence of files previously emptied form the Recycle Bin. Parsers exposing data
and metadata for specific file types abound: Metadata Analyzer [94] for Microsoft Office files,
libpst [95] for Outlook mail archives, libdbx [96] for Outlook Express dbx files, PEView [97] for
Portable Executable Format files, TNEF [98] for ms-tnef MIME attachments, jpeginfo [99] for
JPEG files, and pdfinfo [100] for PDF files. Again, this just scratches the surface.

4.1.4 Live Forensics
Live forensics deals with investigating the state of a live system, either while it is currently
running or from an image of (some part of) its live state. This changes the difficulty and
effectiveness of an investigation in several ways. On a live system, the investigator has access to
all of the utilities on the system, and the running operating system itself. On the flipside,
however, the state of the system is continuously changing, and old data is constantly being
overwritten with new data. Each operation performed to acquire evidence from a live machine
potentially destroys other evidence as files are written to disk, processes are loaded into memory,
and operating system bookkeeping occurs in the background. That being said, live investigation
is sometimes required, and tools and techniques exist to support it. Encase Enterprise edition
[101] adds live forensics capabilities for enterprise networks by deploying software agents on
machines to be monitored. These agents can capture memory and perform other monitoring
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activities under the supervision of a forensic analyst. The Mobile Forensics Platform [102], now
called the OnlineDFS in its commercial incarnation, allows remote, live investigation of
forensics targets without the need to install software agents on the machines under investigation.
Administrative credentials are used to retrieve a variety of information about the running system,
including process lists, open files, and networking statistics. In a live investigation, standard
built-in system utilities become forensically useful for gathering evidence, including: ifconfig,
ipconfig, netstat, date, uptime, ps, lsof, dozens of utilities from the sysinternals [103] suite and
many others. LiveCD’s Incident Responder Collection Report (IRCR) [104], and RAPIER [105]
combine the functionality of several system tools in a batch script for easily acquiring necessary
volatile information on live system state.
4.1.6 Password Recovery
As computer users become savvier, the use of password protection and encryption has increased.
Applications like John the Ripper [106], PRTK, Cain and Abel, and ElcomSoft Password
Recovery Bundle [107] offer differing levels of functionality for recovering password for user
accounts on multiple operating systems as well as myriad password protected file types
(Microsoft Word, WinZip, etc).
4.1.7 Tool Suites
Combining the functions of many of the single purpose tools discussed above, Encase, and FTK
are graphical commercial digital forensics suites with the ability to acquire drive images, parse
most common file types, create full-text keyword indexes, carve deleted files and perform other
common disk analysis tasks. The Sleuthkit, and its graphical interface, Autopsy provide a suite
of tools for analyzing disks at all logical levels, as well as filesystem timeline creation. PyFlag is
an environment for analyzing data from disks, network captures and system RAM; it contains
many log file and protocol parsers.
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4.2 Issues
While DFI has available to it a great many tools and techniques as seen above, there are just as
many gaping holes in the functionality required to perform truly comprehensive investigations.
The reasons for this state of affairs are several. As a field, DFI is relatively new, and there just
has not been enough time and manpower devoted to researching appropriate methods and
developing effective tools. The set of investigative targets is not static; as new applications and
machines are developed, new tools are required. Several fundamental operations cannot be
performed yet, some of which are listed here. No tool exists for deep analysis of Linux RAM
images across kernel versions and distributions. Carving of fragmented files across all popular
file types, with low false positive rates cannot be done. Complete system timelines utilizing all
sources of timestamps (from MAC times, registry keys, kernel structures, log files and any other
source of timestamps) cannot be created. Classification of audio and video files and the ability to
search them for sounds or images does not exist. We do not yet automatically integrate data from
multiple sources into a single view of system state. We have the rudimentary ability to parse
encryption keys from RAM, but no usable tools for decrypting Skype encrypted logs and
captures, SSH sessions in network captures and SSL traffic. These are but a few missing pieces,
and these are the simpler ones. More difficult will be developing tools which extract high-level
meaning from the data parsed by the tools we have. For example, we have parsers for registry
files, but no tools which provide understanding of full forensic implications of the keys in the
files. The tools we do have must be constantly updated for new versions of hardware, operating
systems, applications, and file formats, or they quickly become impotent. We have little or no
ability to do filesystem forensics on newer filesystems such as ZFS [108], or BTRFS [109]. We
are just beginning to appreciate the need for techniques for investigating non-traditional
computers, such as smartphones, game consoles, and GPS devices. Still beyond us are large
single targets, and large networks of targets, due in part to limited resources, but also in part to
poor resource utilization; this issue will be addressed in Chapter 5. As more and more user data
moves to online social networking sites, we require new techniques for discovery of evidence
there. Most tools support Windows and Linux, far fewer support Solaris, *BSD, or OS X, to say
nothing of the several popular mobile device operating systems.
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In order to address one missing piece of the puzzle and therefore enhance the effectiveness of
DFI, we present ramparser, a tool for deep parsing of Linux RAM images.

4.3 RAM Analysis
Recent studies have illustrated that data persists for a long time in volatile memory [110][111].
Unlike tools that analyze running machines, such as Encase Enterprise and OnlineDFS, off-line
memory analysis tools extract digital evidence directly from physical memory dumps. These
memory dumps may be acquired using a number of different mechanisms (dependent on OS type
and version), from hardware–based approaches such as Tribble [9] and via Firewire [112] to
software–only approaches, such as using dd [113] to access the physical memory device or via
insertion of custom kernel modules.
These memory dumping mechanisms are not infallible and some high–tech approaches to
subverting memory acquisition have been proposed [114]. Fortunately, unless the subversion
mechanism is very deeply embedded in the OS, a substantial amount of overhead may be
incurred to prevent acquisition, potentially revealing the presence of a malicious agent [115]. A
recently released tool provides another alternative for memory acquisition, by converting
Windows hibernation files to usable memory dumps [116]. Finally, a novel approach to memory
acquisition called BodySnatcher, involving injection of a small, forensic OS that subverts the
running OS, was presented at DFRWS 2007 [117]. Surprisingly, there has been little work in
deep parsing of Linux memory dumps. idetect [118] is a proof of concept tool that parses 2.4–
series memory dumps and enumerates page frames, discovers user mode processes, and provides
detailed information about process descriptors. [119] discusses many of the relevant OS
structures that must be parsed to extract digital evidence from Linux memory dumps.
Due to the lack of available memory parsing tools for Linux, we developed ramparser, a tool for
deep analysis of Linux memory dumps. Specifically, the current version is able to handle a range
of 32-bit 2.6 kernel variants. The information provided by ramparser from the memory dump
includes running processes, open network connections, in kernel socket buffers, loaded kernel
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modules, and a specific process’s memory-mapped and open files, code, and data. For
experienced UNIX users, the tool is capable of simulating commands such as ps, lsmod, and
netstat. It is also capable of writing out process-specific information and data to files for later
investigation.
struct list_head {
struct list_head *next, *prev;
};

Figure 4.1: struct list_head.

Since the Linux kernel is written in the C programming language much of the interesting data is
laid out in linked lists of C structures. In order to reliably walk large amounts of memory and
find valid structures, common routines were created to validate specific data structures used
often in the kernel. For example, the list_head (Figure 4.1) data structure, which implements
circularly linked lists in the kernel, contains two members, next and prev. In order to help
debugging, after being freed these members are set to poison values. This creates only two
possible values for each of the members, either a valid kernel pointer or their respective poison
values. Incorporating knowledge of these special values and others when searching for various
data types allows the program find valid structures quickly and with few false positives. The
most reliable and useful data types used to validate are lists, enums, stack based character
buffers, and kernel pointers which cannot be null. Lists are implemented as list_head structures
which can be found as discussed above. Enums are useful for eliminating false positives because
they generally have a small range of valid integer values, such as -1, 0, or 1. Stack based
character buffers are excellent for debugging since they can be easily printed, and validating the
strings helps reduce false positives. Kernel pointers that cannot be null also have a relatively
small range, i.e., PAGE OFFSET to 0xffffffff on 32–bit systems. Pointer structure members
which can take the null value are not useful since RAM generally has many zero filled areas and
accounting for them slows down searching. Of limited use are some integers and shorts which
should never have negative values.
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struct task_struct {
volatile long state;
/* -1 unrunnable, 0 runnable, >0 stopped */
struct thread_info *thread_info;
atomic_t usage;
unsigned long flags;
/* per process flags, defined below */
unsigned long ptrace;
int lock_depth;
/* BKL lock depth */
...
struct list_head tasks;
...
struct mm_struct *mm, *active_mm;
...
pid_t pid;
pid_t tgid;
...
/* PID/PID hash table linkage. */
struct pid_link pids[PIDTYPE_MAX];
struct list_head thread_group;
...
/* process credentials */
uid_t uid,euid,suid,fsuid;
gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid;
struct group_info *group_info;
kernel_cap_t
cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted;
unsigned keep_capabilities:1;
struct user_struct *user;
...
/* filesystem information */
struct fs_struct *fs;
/* open file information */
struct files_struct *files;
...
};

Figure 4.2: struct mm_struct.
In order to determine which processes were running on the system when the RAM capture was
created, we must first find the task_struct for the process “init.” Structure task_struct is the
kernel representation of a running process. It is a huge structure containing tremendous amounts
of information on a single running process, including the process identifier (pid), the run state of
the process, and pointers to this processes open files, memory regions, and copious other data
(Figure 4.2). Finding task struct’s is very reliable since the structure contains an enum for the
sleep type, a stack–based character buffer for the process name, many non-null kernel pointers,
unsigned integers, and lists. By validating the numerous members of the structure as it walks
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memory, the program rarely produces false positives. The -d option to the ramparser tool will
parse the memory image for task struct’s and print the relevant members. In Linux operating
systems, the father of all processes on the system is the “init” process, generally pid 1. Since we
know it must be running, and we know it’s name and pid, the first thing that ramparser does is
scan the memory dump and locate the init process’ address by carving task struct’s from memory
until one is found with a pid of “1”. After this, ramparser will be able to walk the entire list of
active processes. The address of init_mm is set next so that we can find paged data in the kernel.
The kernel convention is to use init_mm as the page directory pointer for any in–kernel data
which requires paging instead of being identity mapped. After these values are set, the program
parses the user supplied arguments and performs the desired analysis.

Figure 4.3 Linked List of task_structs

Retrieving Process Information. After finding init it is then possible to walk the tasks member of
init’s task struct which holds the linked list of all active tasks (Figure 4.3). Partially simulating
the ps(1) command is then a straightforward operation, involving walking the process list and
printing out detailed information for each process. More useful operations such as walking a
process’ memory maps, open files, and network sockets are possible by using similar constructs
already used in the kernel. The ramparser -x option performs the simple ps(1) operation.
See Figure 4.4 below for a sample process listing.
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Figure 4.4: Process Listing.

/*
* This struct defines a memory VMM memory area. There is one of these
* per VM-area/task. A VM area is any part of the process virtual memory
* space that has a special rule for the page-fault handlers (ie a shared
* library, the executable area etc).
*/
struct vm_area_struct {
struct mm_struct * vm_mm;
/* The address space we belong to. */
unsigned long vm_start;
/* Our start address within vm_mm. */
unsigned long vm_end;
/* The first byte after our end address
within vm_mm. */
/* linked list of VM areas per task, sorted by address */
struct vm_area_struct *vm_next;
...
/* Function pointers to deal with this struct. */
struct vm_operations_struct * vm_ops;
...
};

Figure 4.5 struct vm_area_struct

Finding mapped files. Under Linux, virtually contiguous mapped regions with the same
permissions are represented by a vm_area_struct (Figure 4.5). These represent a process’ stack,
heap, code section, data section, the data and code section of shared libraries, shared memory,
and anonymously mapped memory. These structures can be viewed on a running machine by
executing ’cat /proc/<pid>/maps’ for the process of interest. ramparser’s -p options simulates
the maps file for a process by walking the list of vm_area_struct structures that are contained
within the process’ mm_struct and printing the starting and ending address, permissions, and the
mapped file’s name, if available. The -v option of ramparser will write the memory pages
covered by a processes vm_area_struct’s to disk. Since these areas are paged, each memory
region is handled 4096 bytes a time when determining the offsets of the data. Using these offsets,
an investigator can completely recreate the running process at the time the memory image was
taken. See Figure 4.6 for sample output for an FTP process.
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Figure 4.6: Sample Process Mapping.

struct files_struct {
/*
* read mostly part
*/
atomic_t count;
struct fdtable *fdt;
struct fdtable fdtab;
/*
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};

* written part on a separate cache line in SMP
*/
spinlock_t file_lock ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
int next_fd;
struct embedded_fd_set close_on_exec_init;
struct embedded_fd_set open_fds_init;
struct file * fd_array[NR_OPEN_DEFAULT];

Figure 4.7: struct files_struct.

Finding open files. The process descriptor contains a files_struct (Figure 4.7) structure which
includes a struct_fdtable which holds an array of struct_file structures. By following these links,
it becomes easy to traverse all the file descriptors of a process. Each file descriptor is represented
by a struct_file which ramparser uses to extract the open files, their permissions, and file
descriptor number. Files with forensics interest include open files on disk, pipes, and sockets.
This information can be viewed on a running system by executing ’ls -l /proc/<pid>/fd’.
ramparser simulates this functionally in the -o option by walking the file descriptor array and
printing the file descriptor number and name of the file opened. Filenames for files on disk are
simply their full pathnames, while names for sockets and pipes are formed by joining
socket[<inode number>] and pipe[<inode number>] respectively. See Figure 4.8 for sample
output for an FTP process.

Figure 4.8: Sample Open Files Listing.
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struct socket {
socket_state
state;
unsigned long
flags;
const struct proto_ops *ops;
struct fasync_struct
*fasync_list;
struct file
*file;
struct sock
*sk;
wait_queue_head_t wait;
short
type;
};

Figure 4.9: struct socket.

Finding sockets/netstat information. Since UNIX systems treat sockets as file descriptors,
information about open network connections can be gathered by analyzing a process’ socket file
descriptors. Each socket is represented by a struct_socket (Figure 4.9) which contains a pointer
to the struct_sock for the socket. The socket structure contains the socket’s family, protocol,
receive and send queues, and state. The inet_sock structure representation of struct_sock gives
the source and destination addresses and ports. Using this information it is possible to implement
a netstat(8) like functionality. ramparser simulates netstat for all sockets when run with the -N
option or gives information about a single process when run with -n. See Figure 4.10 for sample
netstat output.
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Figure 4.10: Sample netstat Output.

struct sk_buff {
/* These two members must be first. */
struct sk_buff
*next;
struct sk_buff
*prev;
struct
struct
struct
struct

sock
*sk;
skb_timeval
tstamp;
net_device *dev;
net_device *input_dev;

union {
struct tcphdr
struct udphdr
struct icmphdr
struct igmphdr
struct iphdr
struct ipv6hdr
unsigned char
} h;
...

*th;
*uh;
*icmph;
*igmph;
*ipiph;
*ipv6h;
*raw;
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};

/* These elements must be at the end, see alloc_skb() for details.
unsigned int
truesize;
atomic_t
users;
unsigned char
*head,
*data,
*tail,
*end;

*/

Figure 4.11: struct sk_buf.

Finding network buffers. Most network investigations involve packet captures taken from the
hostile network after suspicious activity is detected. By using the internal kernel network
structures it is possible to get even more information related to the network activity at the time of
the memory dump. A network socket buffer is represented by struct_sk_buff (Figure 4.11) which
contains protocol–specific information and points to the beginning and end of a complete packet.
Inside each struct_sock structure is a receive queue and a send queue of socket buffers which
hold data yet to be processed. By collecting these queues from open sockets, data that is yet to be
sent out or data that is yet to be processed by a userland application can be gathered and
associated with a specific process. Our experiments revealed that the receive queue was usually
empty since userland servers process data very quickly, which removes the buffers from the
queues. Unlike the receive queues, however, the send queues were generally full during large file
transfers. Tests were run uploading files through FTP to outside networks, and ramparser was
able to recover large parts of the files being transferred. ramparser’s -k and -q options can be
used to dump the send and receive queues of a process to files.

struct module
{
enum module_state state;
/* Member of list of modules */
struct list_head list;
/* Unique handle for this module */
char name[MODULE_NAME_LEN];
...
/* Startup function. */
int (*init)(void);
...
/* Here are the sizes of the init and core sections */
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unsigned long init_size, core_size;
/* The size of the executable code in each section.
unsigned long init_text_size, core_text_size;
...

*/

};

Figure 4.12: struct module.

Finding loaded modules. Loadable modules allow users to insert code dynamically into a
running kernel. While this has obvious advantages, it is also a very common entry point for
rootkits and other malware to run kernel-level code. Modules are represented in the kernel by a
struct_module (Figure 4.12) which is defined in include/linux/module.h. ramparser is able to
find loadable modules in memory with rare false positives due to the module structure containing
an enum, list, stack based character buffer, and many kernel pointers. Searching for modules is
the slowest part of the code since many of the pointers can be null. This decreases the
performance of address validation. After locating a valid struct it is possible to recreate output
obtained from the lsmod(8) command as viewed on a running Linux machine.

4.4 Discussion
Performing thorough DFI constantly requires new tools and techniques to fill in the gaps
between what we would like to be able to analyze and what we can currently analyze. In this
chapter we discussed comprehensiveness in DFI and presented ramparser a tool for deep
analysis of Linux memory. Ramparser fills a gap in the set of functionality currently offered by
digital forensics tools. Using an image of physical ram, it parses kernel data structures in order to
shed light on the live state of the system as of when the image was taken. The data provided is
from the volatile state of the running system and would otherwise be lost. ramparser gives the
investigator access to the list of running processes on the system, including parsing each
processes stack, heap, and memory maps, and enumerating which files and network connections
the process has open. This facilitates deep investigation of the functions of these processes. It
also lists modules which were loaded into the kernel; these are worthy of investigation as they
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are a common entry point for malware. Last, ramparser can list all files which were open on the
system, and all network connections. This information gives further insight into the state of the
running system. These functions duplicate the functionality of several useful utilities that run on
a live machine, including ps for process listings, netstat for network connections, lsof for open
files, and lsmod for loaded modules. This tool aids in conducting more effective DFI by
facilitating a more comprehensive investigation. In the next chapter we turn to the issue of
efficiency in DFI.
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Chapter 5:
Efficiency

The ability to conduct digital forensic investigations (DFIs) within the constraints of available
time, processing power and storage capacity is of paramount importance. This is a difficult
problem, as optimizing the use of one of these resources generally has the opposite effect on the
other resources in the system. It is easy to see that we could perform investigations with minimal
computational resources if we can use an eternity of time. Similarly, we could perform
investigations extremely rapidly with infinite computational resources. Clearly neither of these is
an acceptable tradeoff. We do however require tools to be as efficient as possible for at least
three reasons. With more efficient tools we can increase investigative throughput, which would
alleviate current case backlogs. We can bring more tools to bear on a single investigation, if each
was more efficient. Last, there are targets which are too large to effectively investigate, in terms
of large amounts of storage on a single host, or of large numbers of hosts targeted in a single
investigation. More efficient tools can facilitate investigation of these currently-out-of-reach
targets.
It is clear that terabyte size cases are here and that their investigation is significantly hindered by
the inefficiency of the current generation of tools. What may not be readily apparent is that much
larger targets are already here. As part of a recent investigation into the leak of plans for
operations in Iraq, the DOD seized over 60TB of data [135]. Similarly, as part of the Enron
fiasco, 31TB of data were seized. Only the largest law enforcement agencies have access to even
enough storage space to acquire that amount of data, much less do any type of investigation.
Cases of this magnitude will become more common over time and it is imperative that tools exist
which can aid investigators in their task.
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5.1 Current Trends
In order to better understand why techniques for more efficient DFI are needed, the next sections
discuss three trends that greatly affect the length of time required to conduct effective DFI:
growth in the number and size of cases seen, changes in the types of processing power available,
and the relationship between the size and IO bandwidth of hard drives.

Examinations

Data Processed

Average
Case Size

FY 2003

987

82TB

83GB

FY 2008

4524

1756TB

388GB

Table 5.1: Case Trends.

5.1.1 Case Trends
First we look at trends in the number, size, and complexity of cases under investigation. In Table
5.1, taken from the FBI [120], we see that the number of cases has more than quadrupled
between 2003 and 2008. Even more telling, the amount of data processed during these
investigations has seen a greater than 20 times increase in the same period. Average case size has
more than quadrupled as well from 83 GB to 388 GB. This rate of growth makes clear the need
to use the investigators time as efficiently as possible. As if this wasn't problem enough,
individual case complexity is on the rise. In the not too distant past, there was no need to spend
time investigating voice over IP traffic, chat messenger logs, local social networking website
caches, or mobile phone browser caches, because they did not exist. As new technologies are
created, so is the need to be able to analyze the data created. This further increases the
computational resources required to perform comprehensive DFIs
5.1.2 Trends in Computational Power
Concurrent with the increases in the number and size and complexity of digital forensic cases, is
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the changing nature of how computational power is being increased. Up until recently, creating
faster machines generally entailed creating processors with faster clock speeds. That paradigm
has changed. Clock speed increases have slowed, and instead, multiple processing cores are the
vehicle for sustained increases in computational power, as with Intel's new i7 4 core, 8 thread
processor [121]. Unlike for faster single cores, taking advantage of the power of multiple cores
requires programs be specifically coded to do so. Due to the additional programming complexity
of multi-threaded programs and the desire to get a working prototype as quickly as possible,
most forensics tools are not multi-threaded, and therefore do not utilize multiple cores. Some
tools have recently begun to take advantage of multiple cores on an ad-hoc basis, but with 100core processors on the near horizon [122], current practices need to be re-thought.

Figure 5.1: CPU vs. GPU GFLOPS [123].
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Another trend on the processor front is the general purpose utilization of highly massively
parallel co-processors, such as graphics processing units, termed GPGPU. The 200-series of
GPUs from NVIDIA have as many as 240 cores and are capable of over 900 GFLOPS as
compared to around 120 GFLOPS for the quad-core 3.2 GHz Intel Harpertown processor [123].
The Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA [124]), from NVIDIA is the programming
SDK / runtime for writing general purpose programs which can execute on many of their newer
GPUs. This computational power made available is not without cost, however. The graphics
processor is only useful for highly parallel computations due to its single-instruction multiplethread (SIMT) programming model. Also difficult to utilize is its complex, multi-tiered memory
hierarchy. This makes porting code to the devices even more difficult (and less utilized) than
multi-core processors.
A brief description of CUDA is provided here. Complete details are available in [123]. CUDA
supports a restricted extension of the C programming language. The few syntax extensions exist
to clearly demarcate which instructions are to be executed on the device (GPU) as opposed the
host CPU(s), and to specify where in the multi-tiered memory hierarchy of the GPU to allocate
storage. Functions to be executed on the device are organized into kernels. Kernels initialize a
user-specified number of threads, organized into blocks. Blocks, in turn, are organized into a
grid. While executing on the device, several restrictions exist. The GPU runtime does not
support recursion or function pointers, and most of the C standard library functions are
unavailable.
Architecturally, the GTX 280 (a representative model from the 200-series), has 30 streaming
multi-processors with 8 cores each, giving 240 cores total, and 1 GB of device RAM. Several
other memory spaces of varying size and speed exist including globally accessible constant
memory and texture memory, and per-multiprocessor shared memory and registers. The
difficulty in CUDA programming is a factor of working within the SIMT model, managing
blocks and threads, making careful use of the memory hierarchy, and navigating the device's
many performance-affecting nuances. More detail is provided in [7].
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5.1.3 Storage Trends
Hard disk drives have always been a bottleneck in forensic processing due to the ratio of capacity
to IO bandwidth of the devices. The newest high capacity 2TB drives from Western Digital [125]
are capable of sustained reads of about 76 MB/s [126]. Given these numbers, it would require
about 7.5 hours just to read the entire drive from beginning to end. These numbers are for
sequential access, and can increase exponentially if the reads occurs in a random access fashion.
While solid state drives are significantly faster, their price per gigabyte will ensure that forensics
investigators will have to work with spinning platter hard drives for some time to come.

5.2 Issues
These three trends pose significant problems for DFI for a few reasons. First, most current digital
forensics tools do not take advantage of new hardware advancements, such as multi-core
processors and massively parallel co-processors, like graphics processing units (GPUs). Further,
they do not optimize IO operations, which is critical when one takes into account the increasing
size of the investigations being pursued. Current hardware trends are only making things worse.
Hard drive capacity is increasing at a much greater rate than both the IO bandwidth of these
devices, and the speed of the tools which process the data. Seen from another angle, newer solid
state drives provide opportunity for more efficient DFI. Intel’s X-25M [127] can sustain reads at
over 220 MB/s. Unfortunately, the current generation of tools cannot process data so quickly
Similarly, the switch from increasing processor clock speeds to increasing the number of
processing cores as the main method for increasing the computational power of these devices
[128] requires new coding practices.

5.3 Efficiency Techniques
The efficiency techniques we present and implement are of two distinct types: those related to IO
and those related to computation.
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5.3.1 Sequential IO
Modern hard disk drives are composed of spinning platters with magnetically encoded data. Data
is read from and written to the platters by a set of movable heads. Data is laid out contiguously
on the physical platters. This setup makes reading and writing of data sequentially significantly
faster than reading from non-contiguous parts of the drive, since expensive seek operations,
which require movement of the drive heads, are avoided. Files stored on disk in blocks and
filesystems implement algorithms which attempt to lay out these blocks of individual files
sequentially on disk. Though these algorithms work well, file fragmentation still increases over
time. In order to more efficiently process these operations, all IO should be performed
sequentially. By using knowledge of where on disk the reads and writes will be performed, we
can order these operations so that the set of all operations takes place in the order in which the
blocks appear on disk. Operations on groups of files tend to lump the files according to logical
groupings, e.g. compute the MD5 hash of all files in some directory. This logical grouping of
files in a directory has no bearing on where these files are laid out on the physical disk. This
disparity leads to a huge inefficiency for these types of operations on groups of files.
Approaching the operations on the group of files as a single set of operations and ordering them
according to their order on disk effects significantly more efficient IO.
5.3.2 Reduce Total IO
As the input data set can be huge, so can the output data set. In some cases, where result sets can
include false positives, the output data set can be larger than the input. Due to constraints on
storage space and IO bandwidth, efficient tools must minimize the number and size of reads and
writes that must occur. This can be accomplished in several ways depending on the specific
application. Using compression techniques can reduce the size of the output written size (at some
computational expense). Similarly, reduction of the amount of data written (through careful
screening during evidence analysis to avoid writing irrelevant data) can improve performance.
Using efficient algorithms like Boyer-Moore string search can be sub-linear in their operation
and so not require all of the input data to be examined. In the simplest case, many programs are
careless in their IO usage, making multiple redundant copies of the same data. Eliminating this
waste also reduces the total IO which must be performed. In many cases it may not be necessary
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to write out all results when data about the location of the result in the original data set allows for
on-demand reading of the data only when required by the investigator.
5.3.3 Non-Blocking IO
Digital forensics tools often deal with large datasets which cannot be stored in their entirety in
RAM. Traditional single threaded tools generally do the bulk of their work in a loop which reads
in a chunk of the input data from disk into RAM, performs some processing on the chunk, and
outputs results for that chunk from input to disk. Because of the single threaded nature of the
system, each of these three steps occurs in succession. Specifically, while input is being read, no
processing is taking place, and no output is being written. Similarly, while processing is taking
place, no input is being read, and no output written. This is highly inefficient due to the fact that
even on single processor systems data can be read from or written to disk while processing is
occurring. This is facilitated by Direct Memory Access (DMA), which allows reading and
writing between RAM and certain other subsystems, such as hard drives, without the use of the
CPU. In order to take advantage of this facility, DFI tools must perform Non-Blocking IO. We
define Non-Blocking IO as that which allows processing to continue before the completion of the
IO transaction. In such a system, the three steps in the loop above can occur simultaneously.
While the data for step n is being processed, the data for step n+1 can be fetched, and the results
from step n-1 can be stored. Here the CPU and IO throughput can be more efficiently utilized.
5.3.4 Multicore Processors
Efficient tools must make use of multiple processor cores. Storage capacity and associated case
size are growing at a far greater rate than the processing speed of individual processor cores.
Libraries such as PThreads for C, or built-in threading primitives in Java, Python, and other
languages must be utilized to speed the processing of parallelizable work. Care must be taken to
choose an appropriate language and threading model, as sometimes resulting performance
statistics are unintuitive. For example, multithreaded CPU-bound programs written in Python can
actually perform more slowly on multicore hardware than single core hardware [129] due to
language implementation peculiarities.
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5.3.5 Massively Parallel Co-Processors
Co-processors such as GPUs represent a tremendous amount of computational power, and now
have significantly more usable APIs and runtimes to facilitate general purpose processing than in
the past. Combined with their now widely installed base, their use by DFI tools is necessary to
their efficient execution – a resource which begs for utilization.
Until recently, general purpose programming for GPUs was both difficult and typically targeted
at very specific problems. To perform non-graphical calculations required techniques that recast
data as textures or geometric primitives and expressed the calculations in terms of available
graphics

operations.

Other difficulties

included

non-IEEE

compliant

floating

point

representations, the lack of integer arithmetic, and lack of support for random memory writes.
Newer GPUs, including the Gxx series from NVIDIA and the R600 from ATI, solve most of
these problems and in addition, have large numbers of scalar processors and excel at executing
massively threaded algorithms. In addition, both NVIDIA and ATI have released high-level
SDKs for general purpose GPU programming. NVIDIA’s SDK is CUDA, which allows NVIDIA
GPUs to be programmed using a restricted subset of C. ATI’s GPU programming SDK is
Brook+ [130], based on Brook, which is itself an extension to C that was originally developed at
Stanford University for parallel computation [131]. While most of the existing work on
accelerating security applications is currently based on NVIDIA’s CUDA, the OpenCL [132]
platform, offering execution across NVIDIA and ATI GPUs along with multicore CPUs and
other types of processors appears poised to be the dominant player in the future.

Even using the new SDKs for general purpose GPU programming, such as CUDA and Brook+,
programmers face a relatively steep learning curve and must also pay close attention to the
architectural details of the GPU. Achieving maximum performance when offloading
computations onto modern GPUs still requires careful attention to a number of details. One
important detail is that modern GPUs use a Single Instruction Multiple Thread (SIMT) execution
model, a slightly less restrictive version of the more widely known Single Instruction Multiple
Data (SIMD) model. Another is that transfer bandwidth between the host and the GPU is limited
by bus speed, mandating that GPU computations have significant “arithmetic intensity” to offset
the cost of moving data between the host and GPU. Finally, modern GPUs have complicated
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memory hierarchies, with available memory divided into a number of classes with varying sizes,
caching strategies, and access costs. Despite these difficulties, the effort associated with GPU
programming is worthwhile and proper utilization of GPUs can have a positive impact on the
performance of DFI tools.

In order to demonstrate the use of these techniques on real-world problems, we apply them to the
file carving problem, described in the next section.

Figure 5.2: File Carving.
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5.4 File Carving
File carving is a technique for recovering files which are no longer properly allocated by an
existing filesystem. This can be due to deletion from the filesystem, destruction of the filesystem,
or other corruption. File carving, at its most basic level, uses a database of known sequences of
bytes which signal the beginning of a file (“header”) or end of a file (“footer”). For example, ZIP
archives begin with the byte sequence “PK\x03\x04” and end with the byte sequence
“\x3C\xAC” (see Figure 5.2). Using this information we can scan a raw disk for occurrences of
these byte strings and copy, or “carve,” out bytes between headers and footers as potential
recovered files. Some types of files require that the footer be included in the file, some require
the opposite. Also, for some file types, the footer used must be the farthest away from the header
(within some limit) rather than the nearest to the header. This case comes about when the file
footer appears more than once in the file. File carving is powerful in that it works on any type of
media, and does not depend of the type, or even existence of a filesystem. It does have a
significant weakness, a high false positive rate. This occurs for several reasons. First, this method
assumes that any instance of a header byte sequence is the beginning of a file of that type, which
is clearly not the case. This is especially true for file types with short headers. Also, because files
on disk can be stored in non-contiguous chunks of disk, or “fragmented,” simply copying the
bytes between header and footer will not guarantee that the entire file is captured, or that extra
bytes are not included in the files, or that a file even exists there at all – the header and footer
found may not belong to any file, much less the same file. There has been a great deal of
research on methods for reducing the false positive rate using extensions to this basic version of
file carving.
The next simplest extension is to determine file length based on more information than just the
relative position of headers and footers in the data stream. Some file types store the length of the
file in a field of the internal file metadata. As the point of carving files is generally to open the
files with an appropriate viewer to examine its contents, and some viewers for some file types
are sensitive to extraneous bytes at the end of the file, using the correct length as specified inside
the file itself can help generate more correct carved files.
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It is important to note that some file types have complex, well defined internal structures (ZIP,
Microsoft Office, PDF and others) and some have no internal structure (plain text files). A
greater level of internal structure has more information in it to use for low false positive rate
carving, but also must be recovered correctly in order for its contents to be examined. For
example, a carved plain text file which is actually incomplete, or contains pieces of other text
files, will still be readable in any plain text viewer. A similarly carved ZIP file will not be
readable by a ZIP utility, as the internal structure is broken.
In order to further reduce the number of false positives, some tools attempt to do deeper parsing
of specific file types. Following with our ZIP file example, the internal structure of files
compressed according to the ZIP specification [133] have some metadata about the zip file itself
just following the header. This is followed by the compressed versions of each file in the archive.
At the end of the file is a directory which details data about each file in the archive, as well as the
position of the file in the archive. Using all of this data, one can significantly more accurately
carve zZIP archives,and other well-specified file types with internal structure, from raw byte
streams. A similar techniques is to use simple header-footer based carving, but then use external
file type verifiers to identify the false positives from correctly recovered files.
None of the above techniques help with one of the main difficulties in file carving, fragmented
files. Accordingly, much of the file carving research of late has been concerned with developing
methods for combating the problem of recovering fragmented files. In [137] it is noted that most
fragmented files consist of exactly 2 fragments, often separated by short gaps, and an algorithm
is presented to recover these bi-fragmented files. In [138], a method is presented for discovering
the non-fragmented beginning of a file, the “base fragment,” and then reassembling the entire file
using sequential hypothesis testing. Other methods use statistical characteristics inherent in
specific types of files, such as documents [143] and JPEG images files [139][140] [141] [142] to
correctly carve fragmented files. A broad solution the the general problem of fragment
reassembly is still an open research direction.
File carving is representative of a large class of DFI techniques, with which it shares several
characteristics. It can take a long time to run even on modest data sets. The input data set can be
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huge, on the order of terabytes. Storage requirements can be huge. The output set can be as large
or significantly larger than the input data set, because of false positives. Depending on the
number of file types searched for and the method used to detect them, file carving can be either
IO-bound or CPU-bound. It is a technique used in most any investigation. It is rife with
possibilities for parallelism. Current file carvers are no designed with efficiency as a concern, in
terms of the techniques discussed above. It is with these characteristics in mind that we present a
detailed study of the application of said efficiency techniques to the open-source file carver,
Scalpel.

5.5 Case Study: Scalpel
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the above techniques for efficiency in DFI tools, we
will apply a subset of them to the Scalpel file carver. Scalpel is a performance optimized fork of
Foremost 0.69, which performs carving based strictly on headers and footers. As our baseline we
use a modified version of the widely used and open source Scalpel-1.60. The modification fixed
an efficiency bug in the header footer queue algorithm.
Scalpel execution begins by reading in a configuration file containing header, footer and carving
rules for each type of file it can recover. Headers and footers can be specified in ASCII or
hexadecimal and as regular expressions. Carving rules determine if the footer is included inside
the recovered file, and if headers should be matched to the nearest footer, or the farthest away
footer. Next, the first of two passes over the input file commences. The image is read in 10MiB
chunks, each of which is searched for headers using a modified Boyer-Moore algorithm. If a
header is found for a file type, Scalpel also searches for footers for that type. After all specified
headers and footers are found, and the first pass is completed, headers are matched to footers
according to the carving rules, and a schedule of carve operations is created. Using the schedule
of carve operations, a second sequential pass over the image is made during which the candidate
files are copied from the image into normal files in a user-specified directory.
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Working with an already optimized tool emphasizes the effectiveness of the techniques discussed
in the chapter. For example, Scalpel already performs sequential IO, unlike other file carvers, in
that it performs two sequential passes over the input image. The first pass finds headers and
footers which indicate candidate files. In the second pass, after headers and footers have been
matched up, the data for each file is carved out of the image. It is important to note that in the
second pass, regardless of the number of files carved, or whether or not they overlap, the data is
read out of the image sequentially. This is an example of the first optimization technique
discussed above. Before presenting any optimizations, we establish a performance baseline using
the version of Scalpel discussed above.
The following experiments were performed on a Dell XPS 720 with a quad-core Core2 Extreme,
4GB of RAM, and 2 750GB 7200rpm SATA drives. This machine was equipped with an
NVIDIA GTX260 GPU with 192 scalar processors and 896MB of RAM. All input and output
was done on an 8 disk RAID-0 SAS attached Dell PowerVault MD1000, with a total of 1 TB of
storage.
In order to enhance the repeatability and verifiability of these experiments, a much needed
quality lacking in much of the current digital forensics research, the input disk image used is
from the Digital Corpora, freely available at [45]. The specific image used is the nps-2009realistic.redacted.raw, a 40G Windows XP SP3 image.
All timings are the average of three runs of the experiment (with reboots in between), for each of
three sets of file types. We chose 3 runs and not more due to the relatively stable nature of a
cleanly rebooted machine. Most of the very small variation between runs was due to background
processing done by the operating system. The three file type sets represent three usage scenarios.
The base case is a single file type, to demonstrate IO-bound performance when carving, and
minimal output IO. The normal usage case is 15 file types commonly carved for in DFI. The last
case is 60 file types, which is to demonstrate the CPU-bound case, and maximal output IO.
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1 Type
15 Type
60 Type

Time
2m57s
20m3s
1h19m18s

Speed
231MiB/s
34MiB/s
8MiB/s

# Files
2,476
35,379
141,516

Space Required
121MiB
123GiB
494GiB

Table 5.2: Baseline Scalpel Numbers.

In table 5.2 we see that carving takes from 2m57s to 1h19m18s depending on the number if file
types carved. For the 15 and 60 type cases, the size of the carved files is greater than the 40GiB
size of the image they were carved from, at about 123GiB and 494GiB respectively. This is a
function of the false positive rate, and necessitates significant amounts of temporary storage. The
processing rates range from the respectable 231MiB/s when only searching for one file type to
the positively sluggish 8MiB/s when searching for 60 file types. With targets on a terabyte scale,
an 8MiB/s processing speed is clearly insufficient. In the next section, we begin the quest for
efficiency by eliminating unnecessary IO using a technique termed in-place file carving.
5.5.1 In-Place Carving
The main use of file carving is to recover files which are no longer accessible in a filesystem in
order to examine their contents, either visually or by using some other set of tools. In a sense, file
carving is the process of giving recovered files, here byte streams, the abstraction offered by the
filesystem. This is why the bytes of a file recovered from a byte stream are copied out of the raw
stream and into a file. The abstraction offered by the filesystem gives any other tool the ability to
access the contents of the file using a well-known API, including open(), close(), read() and
write(). A significant inefficiency exists here. The bytes we are interested in recovering are
already stored in the disk image. Copying them out of the image and directly into another file is a
tremendous waste of IO bandwidth, storage, and the respective time it takes to write to the
storage. In this section we present a technique termed in-place carving. This approach presents a
filesystem interface to carved files without the performance penalty associated with actually
carving out the bytes of recovered files.
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Figure 5.3: scalpel_fs Architecture.

In order to achieve the time and space savings characteristic of in-place carving, a multi-level
system is employed. Our in-place carving architecture, scalpel_fs, is comprised of three major
components: Scalpel v1.60, which provides a new “preview” mode, a custom FUSE filesystem
(see section 3.3.3 for background on FUSE) for providing a standard filesystem view of carved
files, and the Linux network block device (NBD) [146], which allows carving of remote disk
targets. We support both live and dead investigative targets and both local and NBD disks.
Similarly, carving operations may be performed either on the same machine that hosts the target
disk device (or image) or on a separate investigative machine. The architecture is depicted in
Figure 5.3..
Operating above a remote disk target is the network block device server, which provides live,
remote access to the disk. Local disks are accessed directly by the Scalpel file carver, operating
in a new “preview” mode. When operating in preview mode, Scalpel executes file carving rules
specified in its configuration file to identify candidate files for carving on the disk devices. These
files are only potentially interesting, as current carving strategies may generate copious amounts
of false positives, depending on the carver configuration. Normally, Scalpel would then carve the
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disk blocks associated with candidate files and write them out to new files. In preview mode,
however, Scalpel produces entries in a database detailing the starting position of the file on the
device, whether or not the file was truncated, its length, and the device where it resides. The
format is as follows:

filename
...
htm/00000076.htm
jpg/00000069.jpg
htm/00000078.htm
jpg/00000074.jpg
...

start

truncated

length

image

19628032
36021248
59897292
56271872

NO
NO
NO
NO

239
359022
40
16069

/tmp/linux-image
/tmp/linux-image
/tmp/linux-image
/tmp/linux-image

Figure 5.4: Scalpel Preview Mode Sample Output.

The original names of files are typically not available when file carving is used for data recovery,
so Scalpel assigns a unique pathname to each carved file. The pathname indicates where the files
would be created if Scalpel were not operating in preview mode. Our custom FUSE filesystem,
scalpel_fs, accesses the Scalpel preview database and the targeted disk devices. The scalpel_fs
application is implemented in C against the FUSE API and provides the standard Linux
filesystem interface to files described in the Scalpel preview database, without carving the files
from the target device. Executing scalpel_fs with arguments detailing a directory to be used as a
mount point, a Scalpel preview database and the device that the database was generated from
causes the following actions to be taken. First, a directory named scalpel_fs is created under the
mount point. Then, using the carved file specifications in the preview database, a tree of
filesystem objects is created in a structure determined by the filenames of the entries in the
database. Files and directories are modeled as fs_object (see Figure 5.5) structures:
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struct fs_object {
int type; // file or directory
char *name; // this object’s fully qualified pathname
int start; // starting index in the source image of the file
int length; // size in bytes
char clipped; // true if the file was truncated
char *source; // the source image file name
struct fs_object *children;
// empty for files
struct fs_object *next;
// peer nodes
}

Figure 5.5: struct fs_object.

This tree structure provides the information necessary to present the user with a filesystem
appearing to contain the carved files from the target devices. For efficiency, a pointer to each
fs_object is also entered into a hash table for fast lookups. Listing the contents of the mounted
directory shows one directory named scalpel_fs. Appearing inside the scalpel_fs directory are
files and directories mirroring those in the filesystem tree created from the Scalpel preview
database.
All file-oriented system calls targeting the mount point of the scalpel_fs filesystem are
intercepted. Preceding most filesystem operations is a call to getattr for the filesystem object in
question, which returns a stat structure containing information such as object type (file,
directory, etc.), size, creation, access and modification times, and permissions. On receiving the
getattr call, scalpel_fs dynamically constructs and returns a new stat structure with type and size
taken from the fs_object for the object and creation / modification / access times and permissions
duplicating those of the scalpel_fs directory. Directory listings are created by using the children
structures of the fs_object for the directory being listed. Opening a file returns a file handle (after
checking the existence of the fs_object in the hash table).
Attempts to read a file are handled as follows: the target device is opened and reading begins at
the offset given by the start member of the fs_object structure for the file (plus any offset passed
to the read operation itself). This is all transparent to the client application (and to the user).
Other non-write filesystem operations also work transparently (e.g., access, getattr, readdir, etc.)
Any operations that would create content (write, mkdir, link etc.) are disallowed in order to
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maintain the forensic soundness of the target. An exception is the delete (unlink) operation,
which is allowed, but only in a shallow manner: the fs_object for the deleted file is removed but
the target disk device is left untouched. This removes the file from the view provided by
scalpel_fs without destroying any data.
At the top level of the system are other user-level applications. They can freely and transparently
operate on the files under the special mount point as if they were regular files (aside from the
disallowed write operations). A user can obtain cryptographic hashes of the files with hashing
programs, view the files in text editors or image viewers, or use specialized forensics software on
the files. This is particularly useful in an investigation involving image files (e.g., JPG or GIF
images) as the images can be previewed as thumbnails by most filesystem browsers. Note that all
of this occurs without the large amounts of space required by a normal carving operation.

Time
1 Type
15 Type
60 Type

2m47s
13m28s
49m17s

Speed

CFB

245MiB/s
51MiB/s
13MiB/s

1.06x
1.5x
1.63x

# Files
2,476
35,379
141,516

Space
Required
204KiB
2MiB
10MiB

CFB: change from baseline
Table 5.3: Scalpel With in_place Carving.

The performance benefits of this system are numerous. Table 5.3 shows the timing and output
data size results for the in-place carving method. Note that as it should be, the number of files
carved is identical. The gains in processing time are due to writing out metadata about the files
recovered in place of the actual files themselves. As the number of files recovered increases, so
do the gains in processing speed, due to the reduced IO requirements. This accounts for the 6% 61% improvement in processing time. Much more interesting are the gains in required storage.
For the 1-type case, storage requirements were reduced from 121MiB to just 204KiB. In the
more extreme 60-type case the storage requirements shrank from 494GiB to 10MiB. This is
approximately a 50,000 times reduction in the storage required. In order to reduce the time
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required by the remaining IO in the file carving operation, in the next section, we implement a
form of non-blocking IO. Note that all further experiments in this chapter use in-place carving in
addition to other performance enhancing techniques.
5.5.2 Non-Blocking IO
In the baseline Scalpel, 10MiB of the input image is read, and then searched. While the search is
being conducted, no further attempts at reading more of the input image are made. Similarly,
while input is being read from the image, no search is being conducted. Since modern machines
are capable of DMA and can therefore transfer data from storage to RAM and back without the
attention of the CPU, this read / process loop is inefficient. In order to be more efficient we
implement a form of non-blocking IO such that reads from storage can be overlapped with
search of the chunks read. This can be accomplished in several ways, but here we leverage the
PThreads threading library for creating independently executing threads, and for the mutual
exclusion constructs necessary for constructing thread safe queues.
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Non -Blocking IO Data Flow
Disk Image
full

reader

Backing Store

host

empty
Output

Figure 5.6: Scalpel Multicore Data Flow.

We first allocate a backing store of 10MiB buffers which will hold data read from the input
image. We then set up two FIFO queues, full and empty (see Figure 5.6). Each queue is protected
by a pthread_mutex_t to ensure its consistency when accessed by multiple threads. For each of
the buffers in the backing store, a readbuf structure is initialized with a pointer to the buffer, and
other accounting information and is place in the empty queue. Last, we initialize a reader
pthread. When these setup steps are complete, the reader begins by getting a readbuf from the
empty queue, reading a chunk of data from the input image into the buffer pointed to by that
readbuf, and putting the readbuf into the full queue, and then getting another readbuf from the
empty queue. Concurrent with this operation, the main host thread gets readbufs from the full
queue, performs the header and footer search on the buffer pointed to by that readbuf. When the
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search is finished, the readbuf is put into the empty queue, and another readbuf is acquired from
the full queue.
This scheme increases the efficiency of Scalpel in several ways. The one-time allocation of the
backing store eliminates the need to constantly allocate and free buffers during the program
execution. The queues allow the reader thread to read input independently of the processing
occurring in the main thread. Similarly, the main host thread can search buffers full of input data
without necessarily having to wait for IO to complete. The practical efficiency however is clearly
dictated by the specifics of the disks, images, machines etc. used on a particular program run.
Results for Scalpel using non-blocking IO are shown in table <<>> below.

Time
1 Type
15 Types
60 Types

1m41s
11m59s
47m21s

Speed
406MiB/s
57MiB/s
14MiB/s

CFB
1.76x
1.68x
1.75x

Table 5.4: Scalpel With in_place Carving and Non-Blocking IO.

The gains in processing speed with non-blocking IO are most pronounced for the 1-type case.
Where in-place carving alone achieved 50% and 63% speed gains for the 15-type and 60-type
cases respectively, it achieved a more modest 6% improvement in the 1-type case. Here the nonblocking IO freed the CPU to continue processing while IO was performed. This result is
reasonable, as this the 1-type case is where we are most IO-bound since we are only searching
for 1 file type. The techniques implemented in this section and the previous section have
achieved significant gains by lessening the constraints imposed by inefficient IO usage. In the
next section we begin to address the issue of processor resource utilization.

5.5.3 CPU Multithreading
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In order to make efficient use of multiple processor cores, we instrument Scalpel for multithreaded operation. During normal operation of our enhanced Scalpel, a single host thread
acquires readbuf structures from the full queue and performs a modified Boyer-Moore string
search for each of the file types it is configured to carve for, in sequence. Because this operation
is the most computationally expensive work performed by Scalpel, and because it is an operation
amenable to parallelization, this is where we implement the required changes. Instead of a single
host thread searching for each file type in turn, we spawn a pool of threads at program
initialization time, one for each file type Scalpel is configured to search for. As each block is
grabbed from the full queue, these threads perform their searches in parallel. This thread pool
uses two pthread_mutex_ts, workavailable and workcomplete as synchronization barriers to let
threads know when to wait for more input data to search and to let the host know when all
threads have finished with a buffer.

Time
1 Type
15 Types
60 Types

1m45s
5m34s
13m33s

Speed
390MiB/s
123MiB/s
50MiB/s

CFB
1.69x
3.62x
6.25x

Table 5.5: Scalpel With in_place Carving and Non-Blocking IO and Multithreaded Search.

As seen in Table 5.5, utilizing multiple processor cores leads to a significant increase in the rate
at which input can be processed. In the 1-type case, where the execution is IO-bound, we see
little change from the previous set of experiments. As we search for more file types, and become
more dependent on the processing speed of the system, the increase in the processing rate is
much larger. In the 60-type case we process input more than five times faster than the baseline.
In the next section, we implement the last of the efficiency techniques demonstrated in this
chapter, by utilizing highly parallel co-processors.

5.5.4 GPGPU
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In this section we first provide some background on GPU programming, based on NVIDIA’s
CUDA SDK, appropriate for use with NVIDIA’s G80 and subsequent GPU architectures. This
section is a summary of the information available in the CUDA SDK documentation at [123];
interested readers are referred to that document for more expansive coverage. The primary
hurdles that a programmer unfamiliar with GPU programming will face are a complicated
memory hierarchy, a Single Instruction Multiple Thread (SIMT) execution model (a relaxed
version of the more common Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) model), and the need to
explicitly stage data in the GPU for processing. The programmer will also face familiarization
with some other issues to obtain maximum performance. First, unlike multithreaded
programming on traditional CPUs, where thread creation is expensive and therefore reusable
thread pools are often used, GPUs create and destroy large numbers of threads with very low
overhead. Furthermore, GPUs perform floating point arithmetic very quickly and memory
accesses (particularly to the large, un-cached pool of device memory called global memory) are
relatively expensive. This is likely to contradict the experience of programmers who have
focused primarily on programming traditional computer systems. The remainder of this section
discusses architectural details relevant to developers creating massively threaded tools for
processing of digital evidence.
5.5.4.1 Execution Model
The latest NVIDIA GPUs are organized as a set of multiprocessors, each of which contains a set
of scalar processors which operate on SIMT (Single Instruction Multiple Thread) programs. The
GTX260 GPU, a commodity graphics card, and the model in the test system for these
experiments, is typical, having 192 scalar processors organized into 24 multiprocessors with 8
scalar processors each. Each of these scalar processors executes at 1.242GHz, for a theoretical
maximum compute capability of approximately 715 GFLOPs. A total of 896MB of RAM is
available on the 260. Subsequent models, such as the GTX280, have more scalar processors,
more RAM, and higher performance. Unlike earlier GPU designs, which had fixed numbers of
special-purpose processors (e.g., vertex and fragment shaders), very limited support for arbitrary
memory accesses (scatter/gather), and little or no support for integer data types, these scalar
processors are general purpose. In addition to the set of scalar processors, each NVIDIA
multiprocessor contains two units for computation of transcendental functions, a pool of shared
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memory, and a multithreaded instruction unit. Barrier synchronization and thread scheduling are
implemented in hardware.

Figure 5.7: CUDA Thread Organization [123].

To utilize the GPU, the host computer is responsible for copying data to the GPU, issuing units
of work to be performed, and then copying results back from the GPU once the units of work
have completed. Each unit of work is called a kernel and defines the computation to be
performed by a large number of threads. The highest level organization of the threads is a grid,
with areas of the grid organized into blocks see Figure 5.7. Each multiprocessor executes the
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threads making up a block in parallel. Since the number of threads in a block may exceed the
number of scalar processors in a single multiprocessor, the threads of a block are further
organized into warps. A warp is a fraction of a thread block, comprised of a set of threads that
are currently executing on a particular multiprocessor. As thread blocks complete execution, new
thread blocks are launched on available multiprocessors.
The SIMT model deserves additional attention. SIMT is related to the more familiar SIMD
execution model, but differs in some important ways. In NVIDIA’s SIMT model, each scalar
processor executes a single thread and maintains its own register state and current instruction
address. A multiprocessor executes sets of threads called warps in parallel, with each thread able
to execute instructions and perform branches independently. Since a multiprocessor has only
one instruction unit, a warp executes one common instruction at a time. If control flow diverges
between threads because of a conditional branch (e.g., taking opposite branches in an
IF/THEN/ELSE), then the multiprocessor executes the divergent instruction streams serially
until control flow resynchronizes. A key difference between SIMD and SIMT is that for the sake
of correctness, programmers need not worry about control flow divergence. Only efficiency, not
correctness, is impacted when threads execute independent code paths (resulting in
serialization), which offers greater programming flexibility.
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Figure 5.8: CUDA Memory Hierarchy [123].
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5.5.4.2 Memory Architecture
NVIDIA GPUs provide a number of available memory spaces, through which threads can
communicate with each other and with the host computer (see Figure 5.8). These memory areas,
with restrictions and associated costs, are:
A private set of 32-bit registers, local to a particular thread and readable and writable only by
that thread.
Shared memory can be read and written by threads executing within a particular thread group.
The shared memory space is divided into distinct, equal-sized banks which can be accessed
simultaneously. This memory is on-chip and can be accessed by threads within a warp as
quickly as accessing registers, assuming there are no bank conflicts. Requests to different banks
can be serviced in one clock cycle. Requests to a single bank are serialized, resulting in reduced
memory bandwidth.
Constant memory is a global read-only memory space initialized by the host and readable by all
threads in a kernel. Constant memory is cached and a read costs one memory read from device
memory only on a cache miss, otherwise it costs one read from the constant cache. For all
threads of a particular warp, reading from the constant cache is as fast as reading from a register
as long as all threads read the same address. The cost scales linearly with the number of different
addresses read by all threads.
Texture memory is a global, read-only memory space shared by all threads. Texture memory is
cached and texture accesses cost one read from device memory only on texture cache misses.
Texture memory is initialized by the host. Hardware texture units can apply various
transformations at the point of texture memory access.
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Global memory is un-cached device memory, readable and writeable by all threads in a kernel
and by the host. Accesses to global memory are expensive, but programmers can use a set of
guidelines discussed in the CUDA Programmer’s Reference Manual to increase performance.
The most important issue governing these memory spaces is that access to the largest general
purpose pool of memory, global memory, is flexible but expensive. Simply staging data that
needs to be processed in global memory without attention to the other memory pools is easier,
but will generally result in poor performance.
5.5.4.3 The Common Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) SDK
We now very briefly discuss the CUDA SDK, used for development of the tools described in the
case studies in Section 4. CUDA is a compiler, set of development tools, and libraries for writing
GPU-enabled applications. CUDA programs are written in C/C++, with CUDA-specific
extensions, and are compiled using nvcc compiler (included in CUDA), under Microsoft
Windows, Mac OS X, or Linux.
A CUDA program consists of a host component, executed on the CPU, and a device component,
executed on the GPU. The host component issues bundles of work (kernels) to be performed by
threads executing on the GPU. There are few restrictions on the host component. CUDA
provides functions for managing the kernel invocations, memory management functions that
allow allocating and initializing device memory, texture handling, and support for OpenGL and
Direct3D. On the other hand, code that executes on the GPU has a number of constraints that are
not imposed on host code. Some of these limitations are “absolute” and some simply reduce
performance. In general, standard C library functions are not available in code executing on the
GPU. CUDA does provide a limited set of functions for handling mathematical operations,
vector processing, and texture and memory management. Recursion, static variables within
functions, and functions with a variable number of arguments are not supported at all on the
GPU component.
Finally, the compute capability of the GPU should be taken into account when using CUDA to
develop GPU-enhanced tools. The compute capability of a GPU device is defined by a major
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revision number and a minor revision number. The initial series of NVIDIA GPUs that
supported CUDA, including the G80, have compute capability 1.0, which provides basic
features. Devices with compute capability 1.1 support all of the features of 1.0 devices plus the
addition of atomic operations on 32 bit words in global memory. These operations include
simple atomic arithmetic (e.g., atomic_add()), atomic swaps, min/max functions, etc. Compute
capability 1.2 adds support for 64-bit atomic operations, adds support for “warp voting”
functions, and doubles the number of available registers per multiprocessor. Warp voting
functions allow the evaluation of a predicate across all currently executing threads on a
multiprocessor and return a Boolean value. The latest compute capability as this chapter is
written is 1.3, which provides support for double precision floating point numbers (devices with
earlier computer capabilities support only single precision).

GPU Data Flow
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Backing Store
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Figure 5.9: Scalpel GPU Data Flow.
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In order to instrument Scalpel to utilize the CUDA-enabled NVIDIA N260 GPU in the test
machine, several changes were made (see Figure 5.9 ). CUDA organizes sets of GPU operations
(memory allocations, kernel executions) into contexts which are attached to individual host
threads. Memory allocations on the GPU made in one host thread (in one context) are not visible
to other host threads. For this purpose, a gpu_handler pthread was created to perform all GPU
related operations. Because of bandwidth limitations between the host and device, the results of
string searches are encoded on the device and then transferred to the host for decoding. To
support concurrent IO, GPU binary string search, and CPU decoding of results, a third
synchronizes queue was added to the system, in addition to full and empty. This third queue,
encoded_results holds buffers of GPU encoded string search results.
After these changes, data flows through the system as follows. The reader thread acquires
buffers from the empty queue, reads input data into the buffer, and puts the buffer into the full
queue. The gpu_handler thread gets buffers from the full queue sends the contents of the buffer
to the GPU for header and footer search, retrieves a buffer of results from the GPU and puts the
buffer into the encoded_results queue. The main host thread gets buffers from the
encoded_results queue, decodes the results and puts the buffer into the empty queue. See Figure
5.8. Note that moving buffers from queue to queue requires only the readbuf structure with the
pointer to the buffer to be copied, not the actual 10MiB backing buffer.
The GPU requires several initialization steps before it can be used efficiently, starting with
memory allocations. A buffer of memory in the global GPU memory space is allocated for input
data from the host, dev_in, as well as one for holding encoded results which will be sent to the
host after string search completes, dev_out. These allocations persist for the entire duration of the
program execution, and are re-used every time input data is moved to the device, or results are
retrieved from it. We then perform initializations related to the string search algorithm used by
the GPU. First we create a table of all of the strings the GPU is to search for, the headers and
footers for each file type, named patterns. Next, in the interest of efficient string search, we
create two lookup tables, lookup_headers and lookup_footers constructed as follows. Each table
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contains 256 rows, indexed 0 to 255. Each row contains a list of indexes into the patterns table
for search strings which begin with the index of this row. For example, lookup_headers[7] holds
a list of indexes into the patterns table of headers which begin with the byte \x07. If there are
three such headers, the eighth row in lookup_headers will contain the indexes in the patterns
table for those three headers. After being constructed, these three tables are copied to the GPU,
into space allocated from the constant memory pool. Since there is a local cache for each
multiprocessor for constant memory, multiple threads accessing the tables gets faster over time,
as more of the table is cached locally.
With these initialization steps taken care of, we discuss the binary string search implementation
on the device. The gpu_handler gets 10MiB chunks of the input image from the full queue and
copies the data to the GPU’s dev_in buffer. Then a GPU kernel is launched to perform the actual
search. A number of 256-thread blocks are initialized equal to the size of the input chunk. Each
thread block copies 256 bytes of the input from dev_in to a local buffer from the shared memory
pool. This staging area enables fast access to the data, and is accessible only to this thread block.
Each of the 256 threads in the thread block then assumes responsibility for one of the 256
starting byte positions in the staging area. Each thread then examines the byte value stored at its
starting position, and looks it up in each of the tables, lookup_headers and lookup_footers. If the
tables point to search strings in the patterns table, a simple search is performed to see if those
headers or footers exists starting at this position in the staging area. Any matches are encoded in
the dev_out buffer. When all thread blocks have finished searching and recording results, the
gpu_handler copies the dev_out buffer off of the GPU and puts it in the encoded_results queue
for decoding by the main host thread.
The result of using the GPU for string search as opposed to the multiple CPU cores is even more
significant improvements on processing speed, as seen in Table 5.6 below.
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Time
1 Type
15 Types
60 Types

1m48s
2m45s
6m44s

Speed
379MiB/s
248MiB/s
101MiB/s

CFB
1.64x
7.29x
12.63x

Table 5.6: Scalpel With in_place Carving and Non-Blocking IO and GPU-based Search.

Aside from the 1-type case where we are presumably completely IO-bound, the GPU is almost
exactly twice as fast as the multicore implementation. This is impressive for a host of reasons.
First, these improvements are in spite of comparison to a highly optimized multicore
implementation running on a machine with 4 very fast cores..And, there is still room for
improvement as there is still potential for optimization of the GPU code. Further, string search is
not a tremendously computationally expensive operation. If applied to operations which exhibit
more arithmetic intensity, the GPU could provide even greater gains.

5.6 Discussion
The focus of this chapter is improving the efficiency of digital forensic tools. As the number of
cases requiring investigation, and their size, continues to increase, we require efficient tools to
process the data within the given time constraints. The current generation of digital forensics
tools performs poorly in terms of efficiency, with few making use of multicore processors or
massively parallel co-processors, maximizing IO throughput, or conserving storage space. To
help alleviate these problems, we presented a set of efficiency techniques and applied them to the
Scalpel file carver. First, we used the in-place file carving technique to significantly reduce the
total IO done by Scalpel, and its storage requirements. We then implemented a non-blocking IO
scheme to maximize the use of IO bandwidth. Next we modified Scalpel’s binary string search
algorithm to take advantage of multicore processors. Last, we leveraged the massively parallel
NVIDIA GTX260 GPU to increase processing even more. In all, the application of the efficiency
techniques discussed here have garnered improvements over the baseline for in-place, nonblocking IO, GPU search based carving of greater than 12 times the processing speed, and
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potentially much larger improvements in disk storage usage. The application of GPUGPU
techniques was the first in the digital forensics community. Because of the potential for faster
processing exhibited in this work, similar GPU-based techniques have been applied to such
problems as MD5 hashing and password cracking. There results achieved here are a clear
indication that many other digital forensics tools could see tremendous benefits from the
application of these techniques. Now that we have discussed improving the reliability,
comprehensiveness and efficiency of DFI, we move on in the next chapter to constructing a
coherent picture of the events in question in an investigation, given the copious amounts of data
at our disposal.

.
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Chapter 6:
Coherence

In previous chapters we have discussed methods for increasing the effectiveness of digital
forensic investigation (DFI) in terms of reliability, comprehensiveness, and efficiency. Once an
investigator has generated data from reliable and efficient tools with comprehensive coverage of
the types of data on the digital devices available for investigation, a coherent picture of the
sequence of events and state of the systems under investigation must be constructed. From the
copious amounts of data generated by a plethora of DFI tools and techniques, creation of a single
integrated view of events which answers the questions under investigation is the next step in the
investigative process.

6.1 Current Practice
Currently, most DFIs are conducted using one of a handful of graphical tool suites, such as FTK,
Encase, Sleuthkit / Autopsy, or PyFlag. Each of these offers some common functionality for
parsing multiple filesystems, computing file hashes, creating full-text indexes and generally
organizing data to make it useful to an investigator. Each also offers additional functionality not
necessarily common to all of the others. For example, PyFlag has a configurable facility for
parsing log files, and Autopsy can construct filesystem timelines.
To analyze types of data not handled by the suites above, (for functionality outside the scope of
that offered by the above tools,) the investigator must use additional tools from a large (and
growing) set of single purpose tools. These may have graphical or text-based interfaces, be free
and open source or commercial and expensive. The process followed is rather ad-hoc and
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revolves around analyzing some of the data output by a tool, discovering some useful bit of
information, and using the new information, pursuing some new avenue in order to discover
more evidence (following “leads”). Any investigative work done outside the confines of a single
tool suite forces the investigator to manage the data generated manually. This situation
influences many investigators to restrict their investigations to the functionality provided by one
of the major tool suites.
It is up to the investigator to manually aggregate the data generated by whichever tools are used
into a coherent model of the events which took place. This is a difficult task for many reasons,
some of which are the subject of the next section.

6.2 Issues
There is a veritable laundry list of difficulties in constructing a coherent view of the events which
have transpired on a digital system.
First, the tool suites discussed above are all restricted to a basic set of functionality that is
generally insufficient for conducting a comprehensive investigation. Further, they tend to be
updated with new functionality significantly more slowly than new techniques are made
available. As new technologies require even newer tools for their analysis, the gap between what
is provided and what is needed grows wider. Further, tool suites,and single function graphical
tools can make exporting data, so that it can be combined with other data, difficult or impossible.
If an investigator uses a set of single purpose tools in order to be free of the restrictions imposed
by a tool suite, a whole other set of problems arises. In the case of text-based tools, each has its
own command line syntax and set of options. Becoming competent with any large set is a nontrivial task. Assuming that there is any documentation for each of them, the quality of the
documentation can range from precise and detailed to very poorly written and misleading. Even
the terminology used can have different meanings across tools, making deciphering their exact
function difficult. Similarly, for units of measurement, as some tools use base-1000 and others
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use base-1024 for measuring storage. Many tools perform similar functions, but return different
results due to the quality of their respective implementations. This forces a thorough investigator
to use multiple tools and aggregate their outputs. On the subject of output formats, there is no
widely recognized standard. Some use XML, and some HTML, but most use simply structured
text. Aggregating data across several tools, whether of similar or disparate function must be
done manually. This requires strategies for parsing individual tool outputs, and ad-hoc record
keeping.
All of the above problems underlie a larger one. In a DFI, the investigator must be able to make
sense of the vast amount of information which a set of tools provides. These tools operate at
various levels of a computer system, some procuring data from raw disk bytes, some at the level
of filesystem metadata, and others at the level of application files, to name a few. They also
operate on various types of media, such as network packet captures, copies of physical RAM, or
myriad types of disk devices. Each tool is non-interoperable with any other, in terms of usage,
terminology, and output format. This leaves the investigator the arduous and time-consuming
task of mentally piecing together a picture of the state of the system under investigation;
assembling this multi-dimensional puzzle requires tremendous cognitive effort. It is also work
that should be assisted by computational tools.
In the next section we present a technique to aid the investigator by automating the process of
building a coherent view of system state from the outputs of various unrelated forensic tools.
Specifically, we present the Forensics Automated Coherence Engine (FACE), a data fusion
framework for DFI. We define data fusion as combining data from multiple heterogeneous
sources into a consistent, accurate composite picture of a system.

6.3 Proposed Solution
The impetus for conducting DFIs is to answer a set of questions about events that occurred in the
past. These questions are generally, “did some specific event occur?”, and if so, “when did it
occur?”, “how was it performed?”, and “by whom?” In an attempt to answer these questions an
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investigator will leverage the tools and techniques at his disposal to generate evidence which
supports a coherent theory of events. The answers provided deal with people, possession and
transmission of sensitive data, times when events occurred, and actions which set these events in
motion. There is a semantic gap here. An individual tool may provide information about some
small piece of data on disk in the system, or show that a web page exists in the browser cache.
The leap from this relatively low-level data to answering the questions posed in the investigation
is left to the investigator to perform with little or no help from the computational resources at his
disposal.
FACE helps bridge this gap. It is designed to present data generated by DFI tools in a format
which helps to answer the questions under investigation. To accomplish this, we start by
identifying some high-level objects of interest in the system – users, running processes, files,
network connections, and events. Most forensics tools give windows into specific facets of these
objects, as when a browser cache parsing tool gives information specifically on the web
browsing history located in a user home directory, or when a wtmp file parser gives information
on user login history. Each of these examples gives some data about the same type of object in
the system, namely user objects, and it is the focus of FACE to aggregate this data and present it
as such. The list of these linkages between low-level data and higher-level objects is vast, and,
for the moment, all the “linking” must be done in the investigator's head. Automating this
process will go a long way towards enabling more effective DFI. To accomplish this, FACE was
designed with the following goals:
•

High-Level System View. FACE presents a view of the system in terms of the high-level
entities on the system, specifically: Users, Processes, Files, Network Connections and
Events.

•

Integrated View of Entities. The interface presents all known information about the highlevel listed entities above regardless of the source of the data, collected in a concise view.

•

Extensible. The plugin API facilitates the inclusion of data from built-in tools, other
currently available tools, and tools to be developed.
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Figure 6.1: FACE Architecture.

6.3.1 Architecture
FACE is a data fusion framework for DFI (see Figure 6.1). It consists of a web-based front end,
on top of a MySQL database, with support from the Django [147] web framework. Below the
database is the pluggable API layer, and below that is a set of modules using the API. A base set
of modules is included with the system. At the bottom of the stack is the raw data level; this is
the data generated by DFI tools which are to be included in the framework. The web-based front
end allows for investigations to be performed over the network by many clients, while the
“heavy lifting” can be done on a single more powerful machine. The MySQL database is
perfectly suited to generating responses to investigator-submitted queries against the data in the
framework. The API, which is discussed in more detail below, allows new types of data to be
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easily imported into the system. Modules written using the API allow users to add new types of
data into the system.

class User(models.Model):
user_name = models.CharField(max_length=32, editable=False)
password = models.CharField(max_length=32, editable=False)
uid = models.PositiveIntegerField(editable=False, primary_key=True)
gid = models.PositiveIntegerField(editable=False)
comment = models.CharField(max_length=256, editable=False)
home_dir = models.CharField(max_length=256, editable=False)
shell = models.CharField(max_length=256, editable=False)
primary_group = models.ForeignKey('Group')
class Meta:
ordering = ['uid']
def __str__(self):
return '%i %s %s %i %s %s %s' % (self.uid, self.user_name,
self.password,\
self.gid, self.comment, self.home_dir, self.shell)
…

Figure 6.2: Module for Top-Level Object: User.

6.3.2 Plugin API
The plugin API supports the creation of modules which facilitate the inclusion of raw DFI tool
output into the FACE framework (see Figure 6.2). Modules are written in the Python
programming language, which offers the ability to call out to native C code for efficiency when
dealing with computationally expensive operations. Each module specifies mappings from raw
data to Python objects. For each type of object specified by a module, several pieces of
information are required. The name, and data type of each attribute of the object must be
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specified, as well as which attribute or set of attributes uniquely identify an instance of the
object. To support the data integration functionality, the module must also specify which toplevel object(s) this object is related to. Last, the module may specify a display function; if one if
not specified, a default is used.
Modules can be created for any type of tool, based on any type of raw data. Using the data and
linkages provided by modules, we can get a more complete view of the system. Such a view is
possible if all available information is considered, including the memory dump, filesystem, log
files, and network traces. The memory dump allows for reconstruction of all processes that were
running on the system, and for per–process analysis, such as collecting open files, active sockets,
and memory mappings. The packet capture contains timestamps and streams which can be used
to easily match network traces to active sockets on the system. The wtmp and utmp files store
information about when users logged in, their login location, and the time of login. Timelines
and the correct order of events are critical during investigations, and by using the timestamps
from file MAC times, login files and network traces the engine can accurately frame what
actions a user performed during specific times. The passwd and group files map users to their
user id, group id, home directory, and login shell. On–disk metadata and kernel structures only
refer to user ids and group ids which are not friendly to a user, but by incorporating information
from the passwd and group files, the UI can present the user with the names representing these
groups and users. This also speeds up investigations since a user can be quickly identified based
on their username.
A fairly complete reconstruction of the state of the running machine and its network activity
becomes possible by fully parsing and analyzing these sources. By integrating the information,
we are able to link data in a network trace back to the user who started the process which caused
the traffic. This is possible by first matching an open socket in the memory dump to packets in
the network trace. Since we know what process owns the open socket, we can then determine
what user started the process and from where they logged in. It is also possible to determine what
file on disk was being transferred by observing the open files of the process. Our system can also
validate data currently queued in the kernel’s network stack with data of the network trace.
Partially transferred files can be fully reconstructed by joining these two sets of data together.
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Analysis of malicious or unknown binaries or processes is made easier as the framework allows
the user to download all or part of a process’ memory or a file’s data. Similarly, sections of
memory can have more traditional forensics procedures applied to them such as file carving and
hashing. Our framework also allows an investigator to get categorized views of disk and user
activity at the time of the memory dump. Using FACE, it is possible to display all activity from a
single user such as open files, active network connections, and running processes.
The rest of this section describes the various components in our framework, including parsers for
network traces, configuration and log files, and the integration engine.
6.3.3 Standard Modules
In addition to a module for ramparser, described in chapter 4, we implemented additional
modules, discussed below.
Pcap Parser: To avoid duplicating the effort of excellent network capture parsing tools like
Wireshark, we opted to implement a much simpler module for parsing captures into a format for
the integration engine to work with. Our module reads in a pcap-format capture file and breaks it
down into streams. Here we define streams as a collection of packets having the same source and
destination IP address and port. This allows the integration engine to display inflows
(collections of packets originating from the host) and outflows (those packets originating from
elsewhere but destined for the host). For each of these streams the module outputs the type: TCP
or UDP (other protocols are not currently implemented), and a list of the packets in the stream.
For each packet in the list, we output the timestamp from the pcap header for the packet and the
beginning and ending offsets of the packet in the capture file. Output is to a plain text file in a
LISP-like s-expression format.
Configuration / Log File Parsers: In order to glean more information from the target system, we
wrote three simple modules to parse a selection of files from the target filesystem. First, we
parse /etc/passwd for information about users on the system (home directory, default shell, the
contents of the comment field, etc) and user id to username mappings. The next module
parses /etc/group for group membership information and group id to group name mappings. The
third module parses /var/log/wtmp. This binary format file contains information on user logins to
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the system - namely the username, time and date of login, and where the login was from (local or
some remote host). Each of these modules outputs a text file in a format similar to the one used
for the pcap parser. Note that the files chosen are only a small subset of the forensically
interesting files in the filesystem. In the future we intend to implement similar modules for many
other interesting files (e.g., /var/log/messages, configuration files for servers, /etc/fstab, and
/etc/xinetd.conf).
6.3.4 Framework
The overall vision behind FACE is to be an extensible platform for integrating and visualizing
the logical connections among objects and events discovered by various evidence collection
tools. Clearly, both the integration and visualization aspects are open-ended problems and our
goal is to build the essential framework around which ever more sophisticated integration and
visualization components can be attached. This approach will also open up the opportunity to
adapt established solutions from other areas to the forensics domain. In its first incarnation,
FACE is web-based and pulls together results from a number of standalone forensics and system
administration utilities to present a hyperlinked interactive interface. The tool is written in
Python, and uses a MySQL database to store and relate the various conceptual units (such as user
identities, filenames, etc.) together. Currently, the framework has modules to integrate the output
from, ramparser, most Linux filesystems, the login log file (wtmp), the /etc/passwd file, the
/etc/group file, and pre-processed pcap files. Adding support for new sources of data involves
writing a module using the provided API. Activating the new additional capabilities is done by
updating the tool’s configuration file; no further software integration effort is necessary.
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Figure 6.3: Users View.

The current version of FACE presents users with five main data views: users, groups, processes,
filesystems, and network captures. Each of these main views can display a listing of all entries in
that category, or a particular entry in more detail. Most fields in the detailed view are displayed
as hyperlinks to related information (possibly viewed in a different tool). The user list (Figure
6.3) displays the user’s name, their UID, GID (linked to the group entry), the comment field
from /etc/passwd, their home directory and shell (linked to their entries in the filesystem), and a
count of currently running processes for that user.
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Figure 6.4: Detailed User View.

In the detailed user view (Figure 6.4), some additional information is presented, such as last
login time, and a listing of all processes run by that user, and a list of all files currently opened
by that user. This view is composed of information obtained by integrating data from
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ramparser, wtmp, /etc/passwd, and /etc/group. The files and processes are linked to their
respective detail screens. The groups view displays a listing of all groups, detailing the name of
the group (as a link to the group’s detailed entry), the GID of the group, and the primary and
supplementary members of the group (as links to those member’s detailed user views).

Figure 6.5: Processes View.
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The process listing (Figure 6.5) shows every process running on the system (as per ramparser
memory analysis), giving the name, the PID of the process, the user running the process, and a
count of open files, open TCP/IP sockets, and memory mappings. The detailed process view
also allows the investigator to view the code segment, data segment, stack or heap of the process
in a hex dump like format or as raw bytes, suitable for saving to a file for further analysis. This
detailed view also shows opened files and their file descriptor ids. If the open file is a real file, it
is displayed as a link to the filesystem view of that file. If it is a TCP/IP socket, it is a link to the
display page of that socket. The next piece of displayed data is a listing of all TCP/IP sockets for
this process. Each entry gives the inode of the socket, the source IP:port and destination IP:port
pair, and a count of the number of entries in the send and receive buffers. Clicking on the inode
number will present the user with a detailed view of that socket. Finally, the detailed process
view shows memory mappings for the process. Mappings of actual files, opened by mmap, or as
a shared library, will be displayed as links to the filesystem view of those files. In addition,
hexadecimal or raw displays of code and data segments for libraries or data for regular files are
available. Similarly, anonymous areas of mapped memory are identified as such and can be
viewed.
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Figure 6.6:
Filesystem View.

The filesystem
view allows the
investigator to
browse a
filesystem
associated with
the investigation.
Each entry in the
filesystem view is
addressed by the
URI /files/<path
to file>, with
/files/ representing
the root directory.
An entry in the
filesystem view is treated as either a directory, or a regular file. In either case, the entry will
display the owner’s username and group (with appropriate links), the permissions flags, the size,
the modification, access and change (MAC) times, as well as a listing of all processes which
currently have the file opened or mapped. If the file is a directory (Figure 6.6), the entry will also
list all directory entries as links to their specific filesystem pages. If the file is anything other
than a directory, the name of the file will be displayed as a link to the actual file as it exists on
the filesystem. The investigator may use this link to save a copy of the file for further analysis.
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Figure 6.7: Packet View.

The main packet view simply lists all packets found in the pcap network trace. The packets are
assigned a unique id, and displayed as links to the individual packet’s detailed view. The detailed
view of a single packet (Figure 6.7) lists the source IP and port, the destination IP and port, the
time at which the packet was captured, and allows the investigator to view the packet in both
hexadecimal view and as raw bytes.
Clicking on a socket’s inode will present the investigator with a detailed view of that socket.
This view gives the bound port and IP (if any), the connected peer’s IP and port (if any), and will
give a listing of all incoming and outgoing packets associated with this socket. The investigator
may view packets individually, or they may view the entire stream in hex or as raw bytes.
6.3.5 Sample Investigative Scenario
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It is not uncommon in corporate environments for malicious users or for malware to transfer
sensitive documents outside of a company’s perimeter. Using current forensics tools, the
methods to determine who transferred a file and when rely on network traces or disk images that
contain parts of the file or substantial fragments. This leaves significant doubt about who really
transferred the file and the file’s origin. Relying solely on network traffic is ineffective because
MAC addresses can easily be cloned or modified. Similarly, simply finding a sensitive file on an
employee’s hard drive does not prove that the file was transferred from that machine.
We developed an experiment to test our system’s ability to correlate data from multiple sources,
to provide a clear investigative picture, and to give more detailed information about the actions
taken by a user. Our experiment involved transferring a large file over FTP while taking a
memory dump and recording network traffic. By combining memory, disk, and network
information, we hoped to map the data in the network stream back to the user who created the
process on the originating machine.
Our scenario involves Ryan Acer, a network administrator for a small company who is suspected
of selling trade secrets to a competitor. An outside investigative agency was secretly hired to
determine if any trade secrets were being transferred outside of the company network, and if so,
by whom. The investigators recorded all network traffic for a day and when they noticed an
unusual spike in outbound traffic, they initiated a memory dump of Ryan Acer’s workstation.
Later that day, they retrieved a copy of the Ryan’s Linux partition using dd, and used these three
sources of data as input to FACE.
Two Debian version 40r3-i386 VMWare images were used, one as a user workstation, and the
other as a server. The services of interest to us were the Apache 2.2.3 HTTP server and the
vsFTPd 2.0.5 FTP daemon. We transferred a large file over FTP from the client machine to the
FTP server while simultaneously downloading content from the web server. This mimics the
activity of a user who is casually browsing the Internet while uploading sensitive documents to
an outside location. The sensitive document for the experiment is named ’file2’ and contains
content that is easily recognizable as proprietary. For the experiment, after the first HTTP
download is complete, the client VMWare image was suspended. Performing the experiment in
this manner allowed us to have a large amount of data in both the network trace and in the FTP
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processes’ network packet queues. This also suspends the process while the FTP file connection
was still open, which allows us to look at the list of open files and match data on disk with pieces
of data in the socket queues and in the network stream. Running Xorg and other non-essential
graphical applications while downloading the file made the experiment more realistic and
produced many more processes for our tools to analyze. Wireshark recorded all traffic up to the
time of the memory dump and its output was saved to a pcap file. The client file system was
copied using dd and netcat. Together this data represents the complete state of the machine at the
time and its network traffic.
After the scenario was enacted, we ran ramparser and our pre-processing scripts on the Debian
memory image, the pcap network trace and the dd image of the filesystem and then FACE was
started. The first step of the investigation is to discover what happened. In this scenario, the
owners of the corporation believe the suspect was transferring proprietary files to an outside
entity, so the first step is to look at what the user was doing. To do this, the investigator retrieves
the process list using FACE. Eight processes have open network connections. Six of these are
system processes and daemons, which leaves two user land processes as initial targets of
investigation. The first process to be investigated is the Firefox web browser. Clicking on
Firefox’s entry shows that there is only one open network connection, so the investigator would
look at that more closely. Upon viewing that connection’s details, the investigator sees that there
is relatively little network traffic, so he can quickly view the streams to see that no proprietary
information was being uploaded through Firefox. Further, none of the open files appears to be
proprietary data.
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Figure 6.8: FTP Process View.
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After noting that the user was not likely uploading proprietary data via Firefox, the investigator
turns to the next likely culprit, the FTP process. Viewing this process shows two active network
connections and one of them has a large amount of associated traffic and a significant amount of
data left in the send queue (see Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.9: File file2.
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Further, the investigator notes that FTP has as one of its open files /root/file2 (Figure 6.9), the
proprietary file mentioned in the scenario setup.

Figure 6.10: Raw Socket Data.

The investigator first views the FTP command stream, and locates the command to upload file2
(STOR file2) in the outgoing network stream (Figure 6.10). The investigator then views the
contents of the data stream seeing that the proprietary information is in fact being transferred
over the network as file2. Finally, the investigator clicks on the entry for open file /root/file2, and
verifies the access time and the contents of the file, that it is indeed the proprietary file that the
culprit should not have uploaded.
Now that the investigator knows which process was used to upload the file, he can attempt to
figure out when the file was uploaded. This can be done by simply noting the times associated
with the first and last packet in the FTP data connection which was used to upload the file (20083-12T10:10:47 and 2008-3-12T10:11:0), and can then note that this time is about the same as the
last access time of the file /root/file2 (2008-3-12T10:11:0). The final question that the
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investigator needs to answer is whether or not the suspect was the one who uploaded the file. The
FTP process was run as the root user, whose last login was 2008-3-12T9:34:57 (see Figure 6.4),
about 35 minutes before the file was transferred. The login was noted to be local, so the user had
to have physical access to the machine; this rules out an outside attacker. The only other clue we
have to the perpetrator’s actual identity is the username and password pair used in the FTP
process: racerx/racerx123. Because the suspect’s name is Ryan Acer, this is indicative but not
conclusive evidence that he may have been the culprit.

Discussion 6.4
In this chapter we have discussed the coherence issue in DFI. Investigations of digital devices are
inherently complex, and the largely ad-hoc process of synthesizing the large amounts of data
generated by a similarly large set of tools is a difficult, manual process. Current tools make no
attempt to integrate data generated by a set of digital forensics tools into a coherent picture of the
state of the system under investigation. To remedy this situation, we developed FACE, a tool
which removes some of the burden from the investigator by automatically integrating data about
high-level system entities, and presenting it to the investigator as such. FACE provides an API
against which modules can be constructed. These modules can take data generated by a set of
digital forensics tools, and link them to the higher-level objects they describe. This linkage is
presented to the investigator in a web-based interface, giving a clearer view of the state of the
system. This eases the process of constructing a coherent picture of a system under investigation,
which aids in conducting more effective DFI.
This chapter ends our discussion of the four characteristics of effective digital forensic
investigation; the next chapter provides some conclusions and thoughts on future work.
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Chapter 7:
Conclusion

Digital forensics is the science concerned with the collection, preservation and analysis of
evidence from digital devices. These digital devices may include traditional computer systems,
PDAs, cellular phones, and virtually any other device that stores digital data. The digital forensic
investigative process proceeds in four phases. In the first phase, collection, forensically sound
copies of available evidence are created. Once collection is complete, the examination phase
begins, which involves enumeration of the objects of interest from available evidence. System
state information, files, running processes and other types of data are parsed and catalogued for
use in the next phase, analysis. The focus of the analysis phase is to use the data generated in the
examination phase to answer questions regarding the investigation such as “what events have
occurred on the system?” and “who was responsible for these events and when and how?”
Answers to these questions may demand further evidence collection, examination, and analysis.
When done, the last phase, reporting, is entered. Here the investigator generates a report detailing
the findings of the investigation, along with methodology used to generate those findings.
In order to perform the essential tasks that make up these phases of a digital investigation
effectively, an investigation must be reliable, comprehensive, efficient, and coherent. The
current state-of-the-art in digital forensics practice falls short in each of these aspects and the
focus of this dissertation has been to provide practical solutions to each, which, when taken as a
whole, vastly improve the effectiveness of digital investigations. Below, each aspect of
effectiveness is briefly summarized, along with the related contributions of this dissertation.
We say an investigation is reliable if the evidence generated is accurate, and free from
tampering, whether malicious or accidental. The need for reliability in investigations is clear,
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without it we can not rely on any of the conclusions that are drawn. To support the reliability
characteristic, investigators rely on cryptographic hashes of data, and on newer tools, such as
Digital Evidence Containers. While these techniques are useful for detecting data tampering and
corruption, and for bundling case metadata with case data, they do not offer help with the
problem of keeping records of operations performed on the data, a process we term auditing.
Auditing is important for two main reasons. In the course of an investigation, a large number of
tools may be used in analyzing the data for evidence, and a record of the methodology used is
required for report generation. Recording these activities is largely a manual, error-prone
process. Second, many tools in use have bugs, and, as such, their correct function cannot be
completely relied on. To remedy this situation, we developed FDAM, the Forensic Discovery
Auditing Module. FDAM provides a filesystem which logs all accesses to files within it,
enforces access restrictions (e.g., write blocking), and can periodically re-hash evidence. It logs
not only which applications have accesses evidence files, but when, what specific parts of the
evidence were written or read, and what user owned ran the application. The log created by
FDAM specifically addresses the problems listed above by auditing all accesses to evidence
files. In the future FDAM can be extended to record significantly more data about the context of
data accesses, further increasing the reliability of investigations conducted with its use.
We say that an investigation is comprehensive if its analysis includes all potential items of
interest. While resource constraints make this impossible in the perfect sense, a comprehensive
investigation should analyze as many of the potentially interesting targets as possible. At a
physical crime scene, investigators collect items which may have evidentiary value, and preserve
them for later analysis. Conversely, in a digital forensic investigation, the investigator can make
perfect copies of some aspects of the entire crime scene (e.g., data in non-volatile storage on the
digital devices). Because digital artifacts are not plainly visible, tools are required for their
analysis. This is problematic as there are many types of data which could be of forensic interest,
and each requires a tool or tools for its analysis. While digital forensics currently has at its
disposal a great many tools, this number is far outweighed by the number of types of data that
exist on today’s complex machines. This disparity underlies the many gaps where no tool exists
for analysis of many interesting types of data. To fill one such gap, we developed ramparser, a
tool for deep analysis of images of RAM on Linux systems. When a machine is powered down,
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much of the volatile information about its current state is permanently lost. For standard
computers, this includes running processes, open files and network connections, loaded modules,
and tremendous other amounts of information. Given an image of physical RAM, ramparser
parses kernel structures to extract information on the live state of the system as of when the
image was created. It is able to emulate the functions of several Linux system tools, such as ps,
lsmod, and netstat, as well as do deeper extraction of process data, such as its code, data, stack,
and heap. ramparser exposes types of information from digital devices which were simply
inaccessible before its development. We plan for future versions to work across a wider range of
Linux kernels, and to more fully parse available kernel structures in order to expose more data
relevant to an investigation.
Intimately related to comprehensiveness, is the efficiency characteristic of effective digital
forensic investigations. As stated above, perfectly comprehensive investigations are impossible
when operating within the bounds of available resource constraints. A digital forensic
investigation is efficient if it maximizes the use of constrained resources, which can include
processing power, data storage, time, and manpower. The set of currently available tools, most
being hastily developed to address some pressing need, are ill equipped to make efficient use of
available IO, storage, multiple processor cores, or massively parallel co-processors. In order to
address this issue we developed several enhancements to the open source digital forensics tool,
Scalpel, a file carver, to demonstrate design decisions that should be applied to future forensic
tools. File carving, a file recovery technique, is representative of many digital forensics tools in
that it often deals with a large data input set (e.g., a disk image), a potentially larger output set,
and can be either IO-bound or CPU-bound depending on the number of file types for which
recovery is attempted, and the specific recovery techniques used. Over the course of
implementing the enhancements to Scalpel, we produced order-of-magnitude-level
improvements in processing speed and storage usage. We believe that theses techniques can be
applied to many other digital forensic tools, achieving similar results. As part of this work, some
processing was offloaded to an NVIDIA GTX260 GPU. This was the first use of this technique
(offloading computation to massively parallel coprocessors) in the digital forensics community.
We showed that there is tremendous potential for speeding up forensic processing using such
devices, and in the future we plan to leverage this technique to develop other efficient tools.
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The final characteristic of effective digital investigation covered in this research is coherence.
We say that an investigation is coherent if the evidence resulting from the analysis can be used to
compile an integrated view of the events under question. The current set of digital forensics tools
is composed of a plethora of small, single purpose applications which produce data on some
small part of a digital system. While some tool suites bundle many functions into one larger
application, no attempt is made to provide linkages between the types of data generated by
individual tools. Many individual tools can give information on a single entity in the system, e.g.,
a file, but linking the data together into a single picture is left to the investigator to perform
manually. Take for example a document file. The file tool will tell the type of the file, the
Sleuthkit will provide details of the file’s allocation in the filesystem, md5sum will generate the
hash of the file, and Metadata Analyzer will parse the format specific metadata stored in the file.
But getting a coherent picture of all of the information about the file must be done manually by
the investigator - a difficult task. We developed FACE, the Forensics Automated Coherence
Engine to simplify this process. FACE provides a framework with an extensible pluggable API
for integrating data from a set of tools into coherent picture of the entities in the system. Using
this framework, modules can be developed which are used to absorb data from tools, and link the
data to the entity the data describes. This removes much of the burden from the investigator, and
aids in forming a more coherent picture of the system being investigated. Future generations of
this tool will attempt to eliminate the need for module writing by examining the data output from
tools and automatically deciding the linkages to create to the entities in the system. This would
further reduce the burden on the investigator, and allow tool to be integrated into the framework
more quickly. We also intend to research applications of this technique outside of the digital
forensics arena. Specifically, the medical and geological fields, and potentially others, deal with
a similar glut of low-level data from which a higher-level picture must be constructed, and some
FACE-like construct may be useful.
In summary, in this research we have addressed the four characteristics of effective digital
forensic investigation, reliability, comprehensiveness, efficiency and coherence, and have
developed techniques to enhance each of them. There is still much work to be done, as each of
the new techniques developed addresses a relatively small part of a much larger problem, but the
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work discussed in this dissertation makes substantial contributions to improving state-of-the-art
in digital investigations.
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